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The agricultural trading environment is increasingly determined by food safety and quality 
standards. Standards define the terms of chain membership, imply rules and conditions for 
participation, and hence lead to processes of (re)distribution within the chain. For some 
producers, standards may open up new opportunities as they permit market access to 
particular market segments. At the same time, the process of (re)distributing market shares is 
accompanied by marginalization and exclusion, as standards may impose prohibitively high 
barriers for certain producers in terms of the short-term and long-term efforts needed for 
production under certification. This thesis aims to have a closer look at the concern voiced by 
many researchers that food safety and quality standards establish a particular burden for 
exports from developing countries and, within the developing countries, for the small 
producers. Coming from this starting point the thesis aims to establish a detailed 
understanding of a) how developing countries` export shares are affected differently by food 
safety and quality standards, b) the particular impact of food safety and quality standards on 
small producers and c) the compliance decision process standards at the producer level.  
Results of the thesis show that developing countries are a heterogeneous group that shows 
various different tendencies regarding market share development under the impact of 
strengthening food standards. In addition, the analysis showed that “being small” in terms of 
export quantity at the country level does not necessarily lead to a negative impact of food 
safety and quality standards on the export share. Results of the analysis rather hint to the fact 
that a stronger involvement of the government and the private sector in SPS activities as well 
as a better communication structure within the country increase SPS capacity of a country and 
thus have a positive effect on a successful export performance.  
The same differentiated perspective is necessary to understand the impact of food safety and 
quality standards on small producers. On a theoretical basis small farmers could well have a 
comparative disadvantage in complying with quality standards owing to their specific 
endowments, which hamper their ability to acquire information on the standard and to 
implement it. However, empirical evidence of the Moroccan case study shows that farm size 
only correlates marginally with the cost or compliance. The survey rather shows how 
important the forward integration in the value chain is in order to understand the importance 




shares or even increase those in high quality markets, producers need information about the 
buyers’ requirements. Results of the survey show the importance of vertical coordination and 
direct information exchange between downstream actors, buyers and producers as information 
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The export of agricultural and food products to industrialized countries is of particular 
importance for most developing countries’ economies. The international trade in these 
products has expanded remarkably over the last decades, notably in high-value food products. 
Fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, fish, meat, nuts, and spices now jointly account for 
more than 50 % of the total agri-food exports of developing countries (CTA, 2009). Among 
these products, the trade of fruits and vegetables is exceptionally dynamic since the demand 
of consumers in high income countries for exotic and out of season products opens up new 
markets for southern suppliers (Borot de Battisti et al., 2009).  
The positive development of the sector provides foreign exchange earnings to the exporting 
developing countries. Additionally, since horticultural production is labor intensive the 
positive development of the horticultural sector offers a source of income to those with little 
access to land and an employment possibility in rural areas, where few alternatives regarding 
work exist. However, an important development that affects the degree of opportunities facing 
developing country suppliers is the proliferation and increasing stringency of food and 
agricultural quality standards
1
 which pose new and huge challenges to most exporting 
developing countries (Broberg, 2009; Disdier et al., 2007; Henson et al. 2001; Jaffee and 
Henson 2004; Wilson and Abiola, 2003; Otsuki et al., 2001, Wilson and Otsuki, 2001).  
The increasing prevalence and strengthening of standards within the last two decades can be 
explained by three major reasons: First, consumers in high income countries demand high 
quality and healthy products. The consumers’ perception of food has been seriously affected 
by various food scandals such as BSE, FMD, pesticide residues in fruit and vegetables and 
overall environmental pollution. These incidents have intensified concerns about healthy 
nutrition and raised the awareness regarding the quality of one’s daily diet. Additionally, 
                                                 
1 Food quality standards include various product and process attributes required by the consumer: the 
technical value, the sensory quality, the nutritional value and all aspects of food safety, as well as the 
idealistic and psychological values of a product (Brockmeier, 1993; Wiegand, 1997). Food safety is an 
integral part of product quality since it is a basic prerequisite for any quality attribute (OECD, 2009). Food 
safety is a “public good” because safe food is a basic requirement of any food system to ensure trust in the 
food supply (OECD, 2009). It is the responsibility of the government to provide regulations which guarantee 
that food is safe when offered to consumers. Akerlof (1970) was the first to show that markets will not 




consumers increasingly demand that the production and processing process of their food is 
environmentally sustainable, animal friendly and that recognized social and labor standards 
are adhered to (Fulponi, 2007).   
The second reason for the increasing prevalence of standards can be found on the supply side: 
Retailers are the main link between consumers and the upward food chain. One of the 
retailers’ new tasks is the communication of consumer demands back up the chain and 
product information downwards to the consumer. Retailers try to deliver the “desired” 
products in an increasingly competitive market where price competition has changed to price 
– quality competition (Fulponi, 2007). Traditional essentials such as cost efficiency and 
supply reliability are not sufficient anymore to increase or keep market shares. As a result, the 
agri – food system in most high income countries has changed significantly. There is the 
tendency to move away from spot markets to higher degrees of vertical coordination (Pingali 
et al., 2005; Buhr, 2003; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). One aspect of the vertical coordination 
process is the increasing prevalence of standards which enables the heterogeneous 
characteristics of a product, including process and traceability requirements, to be marketed 
whenever there is a willingness to pay for these characteristics. This makes quality standards, 
which may be public as well as private, an ideal instrument to overcome market inefficiencies 
and to reduce transaction costs. 
The third motivation to introduce food and agricultural standards can be found in the ongoing 
liberalization process of agricultural markets. In the Uruguay Round, the highly protected 
agricultural sector was for the first time effectively included in the international negotiations 
on trade liberalization. Traditional protection measures for the agricultural sector had to be 
dismantled to a large extent and developing countries saw the access to industrialized 
countries’ food and agricultural markets as a main motivation for approving the Uruguay 
Agreement (Beghin, 2001). However, the liberalization and consequently globalization of 
food and agricultural supply means that new food safety risks are being introduced into 
countries and contaminated food can be spread across greater geographical areas, causing 
illness on a global level (Buzby, 2001). As a consequence, simultaneously with the 
liberalization of agricultural markets the importance of food safety and quality measures 
increased significantly (Grothe, 2002). Safe food is defined by a certain tolerable level of 
hazards in food. How high this level is differs tremendously from country to country; this 
depends on cultural habits, economic development, climate conditions and the institutional 




Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement) allow countries to adopt technical regulations in order to protect human, animal 
and plant health as well as to ensure environment, wildlife and human safety. The SPS and the 
TBT Agreements respect the national sovereignty of countries to define their individual level 
of food safety while introducing a regulatory framework which aims to keep the possible 
trade impeding effect of these safety measures as minimal as possible. However, developing 
countries underline the possibility of using food safety measures as a substitute for traditional 
trade barriers and point out their potentially protectionist motivation.  
The three aspects mentioned above result in stricter mandatory food and agricultural safety 
measures from the governmental side as well as in the increasing prevalence of private 
voluntary quality standards in food market chains. Even though the governmental legislation 
constitutes the minimum requirement for market access, the compliance with private 
standards is required by many of the larger retailers and turned out to be “quasi-mandatory” 
for high income markets (Borot de Battisti et al., 2009).   
For the EU market the most important private standards are the European retailers’ protocol 
for good agricultural practice for farms (GLOBALGAP
2
) and the British Retail Consortium 
Global Technical Standard, which applies to processors. Some developing countries perceive 
the trade-restrictive impact of private standards as being greater than the legal requirements 
set by governments.  
Food quality standards differ between countries because of various reasons. These can be 
found in different tastes, diets, income levels as well as climatic conditions and available 
technology (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Most standards are imposed by national governments 
or private bodies in high income countries and create major challenges to suppliers from 
developing countries who operate in very different political, institutional and economic 
circumstances. Therefore, the overall concern prevailing in this discussion is that the bulk of 
different standards in combination with the lack of technical, administrative and financial 
capacity will disfavor developing countries’ participation within international trade (e.g. 
Broberg, 2009; Disdier et al., 2007; Henson and Jaffee, 2006; Wilson and Abiola, 2001; 
Wilson and Otsuki, 2001).  
                                                 
2 GLOBALGAP is formally known as EUREPGAP. In late 2007, EUREPGAP changed its title to 
GLOBALGAP to reflect the farm assurance standard’s expanding international role. Since most research on 




However, empirical evidence on the particular impact of standards on developing countries’ 
trade flows is still limited. Available surveys are mainly case studies which analyze the 
impact of SPS measures on trade flows of individual developing countries’ export sectors 
(e.g. Aloui and Kenny, 2005; World Bank, 2005; Henson et al. 2000, Maertens, 2006; Minten 
et al. 2006). Little quantitative research is available (e.g. Chen et al., 2006; de Frahan and 
Vancauteren, 2006; Disdier et al., 2007, Moenius, 1999;  Moenius, 2006; Wieck, 2006; Yang 
and Woo, 2005) and finally, little research exists which leads to a more differentiated and 
comparative perspective of the impact of agricultural and food standards among the group of 
developing countries. Available literature which aims to provide a more detailed perspective 
is mainly based on theoretical considerations or draws a synthesis of the existing case studies 
within a common analytical framework (e.g. Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003; Disdier et al. 
2007, Frohberg et al. 2006; Henson and Jaffee, 2006, Maertens and Swinnen, 2006, World 
Bank, 2005).  
Another critical point associated with the increasing prevalence of standards is the potential 
exclusion of developing countries’ small producers from high-standards export markets, with 
subsequent negative effects on household incomes and rural poverty. Several surveys outline 
the specific problem of food standards disadvantaging smaller business (Gibbon, 2003; 
Humphrey et al., 2004, Reardon et al., 2001, Reardon et al., 2003, World Bank, 2005; 
Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2005). The reasons often mentioned for this tend to fall into two 
main categories: 1) The costs of compliance with a certain quality standard may be higher for 
small producers (World Bank, 2005; Aloui and Kenny, 2005; Jaffee and Henson, 2004; 
Willems et al., 2005) or 2) the transaction costs involved in the compliance process for other 
chain participants such as exporters may be higher in the case of smaller farms. It may 
therefore be better for buyers to cooperate with larger farms (Pingali et al., 2005; Swinnen, 
2005). 
Various surveys state that particularly private standards (such as the GLOBALGAP standard), 
which require on-farm process certification and subsequently lead to a sudden increase in the 
cost of compliance, are regarded as too demanding to be run by smallholders (Borot de 
Battisti et al., 2009). Further, the certification process of private standards often regulates not 
only food safety aspects but additional social, environmental and ethnical criteria along the 
supply chain as well. 
According to Maertens and Swinnen (2009), empirical surveys show a mixed picture rather 




Jaffee, 2003), Morocco (Aloui and Kenny, 2005), Costa Rica (Berdegué et al., 2005) and 
Senegal (Maertens, 2006) rather describes examples of small farmers losing market share as a 
result of increasing quality standards. Other surveys find very different effects. Examples for 
the inclusion of small farmers in modern value chains can be found, for example, in 
Madagascar (Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen, 2006) and South Asia (Gulati et al., 
2007). 
However, the overall problem with the available literature is that – even if it has expanded 
rapidly since the end of the 1990s, when the relevance of standards for international trade of 
agricultural and food products first attracted the interest of researchers – few surveys with 
primary empirical data are available. Questions like 1) which determinants lead to a possible 
negative impact of standards on small producers and 2) which factors finally might lead to 
“non-compliance” with certain standards are still being insufficiently addressed.  
Since smallholder agriculture shows a great impact on rural equity and poverty the question 
whether small farmers are disfavored by the prevalence of standards is a relevant question 
from a development perspective. Smallholdings are typically operated by poor people who 
use the major part of their labor capacities, both from their own households and from their 
neighbors. When small-farm households spend their incomes, they tend to spend them on 
locally produced goods and services, thereby stimulating the rural nonfarm economy and 
creating additional jobs (Hazel et al., 2007).  
2 Research objective  
Overall, the thesis aims to analyze the impact of quality standards on developing countries 
from three different perspectives:  
1) It aims to analyze the trade effects of standards.  
The thesis evaluates the trade performance of developing countries in a trading environment 
which is determined by standards. It particularly analyzes the question of how developing 
countries’ export shares develop in a different manner under the particular aspect of 
standards.  
2) It aims to analyze the particular impact of standards on small producers. 
The thesis theoretically assesses the effect of standards on small producers in developing 




to what extent small producers in developing countries are at a disadvantage due to the 
increasing prevalence of standards and provides a detailed overview of the existing 
literature.  
3) It aims to analyze the compliance process with private standards 
Addressing the compliance process of standards, the thesis analyzes two particular 
questions: 1) Which producers comply, and which do not; and 2) why do some producers 
comply while others do not? This thesis explores these two questions with regard to the 
Moroccan tomato export sector. It provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
compliance decision behavior and the compliance process.  
3 Outline and Summary  
The four articles which constitute the core of this thesis address the impact of standards on 
developing countries from different perspectives. The first paper approaches the topic from a 
macroeconomic perspective which allows for an analysis of the impact of standards on trade 
and the impact of standards on developing countries’ market shares. In the following papers 
the perspective becomes much more microeconomic focused. The second paper switches 
from the macroeconomic perspective to the impact of standards within countries. It aims to 
structure the problem theoretically. Finally, the third and the fourth paper comprise case 
studies of the Moroccan tomato sector and analyze the individual compliance decision 
processes of farmers.  
As explored in section 1 the debate on better market access for and the competitiveness of 
developing countries’ agricultural exports cannot be separated from the discussion on the 
effects of food and agricultural standards on the ability of developing countries to export 
goods. Even though available literature frequently points to the potential market share losses 
of developing countries due to the prevalence of standards, little empirical evidence on the 
particular impact of standards on developing countries’ trade flows is available (see 
section 1). The first paper, entitled “Standards, a catalyst for the winners - a barrier for 
the losers? An empirical analysis of the impact of SPS measures on the trade 
performance of developing countries”, aims to contribute to a more differentiated and 
comparative perspective of the impact of agricultural and food standards among the group of 
developing countries. Further, the paper aims to assess whether it is possible to empirically 




Exports of developing countries to OCED countries are compared between two time spans: 
1993 to 1995 and 2002 to 2004. Between these two periods, the prevalence of standards set by 
OECD countries increased significantly. Further, the paper concentrates on two commodity 
groups that are strongly influenced by standards - fruits/vegetables and meat. A cluster 
analysis groups countries according to their trade performance into those that have managed 
to increase market share and those that lost market share, respectively.  
Results of the analysis show that in line with the overall considerations on market 
concentration most large scale exporting countries managed to increase their export 
performance while various smaller scale exporter lost market share. However, there are 
considerable differences between the results of the fruit/vegetable sector and the meat sector. 
Even though the market for fruits and vegetables is heavily dominated by a few major players, 
various small scale exporting countries increased their market share during the second period. 
Results of the meat market analysis show very different results. The cluster analysis 
underlines the observed strong concentration process taking place in the meat market with two 
giant winners – Chile and Brazil – and numerous small-scale exporting countries that are 
losing market share heavily.  
Regarding the question of whether it is possible to empirically assess the particular impact of 
standards on trade performance, the concept of “SPS capacity” is introduced using a gravity 
model. “SPS capacity” is described by five variables. All variables have been chosen as the 
best available indicators to express a country’s commitment, interest and efforts made to 
comply with its trading partners’ requirements. Since data availability is very limited, most of 
the data has been developed by the authors. Results of the analysis empirically support the 
impact of SPS measures on trade flows. However, the results of the gravity model have to be 
interpreted carefully because of limited data available. Most interesting is the positive result 
of the EUREPGAP variable which underlines the importance of private sector involvement in 
food quality requirements in order to increase market share. 
The second paper, “Quality Standards for Food Products – A Particular Burden for 
Small Producers in Developing Countries?”, develops an analytical framework which 
structures the problem of whether, how and to what extent small producers in developing 
countries are disadvantaged by the increasing prevalence of food quality standards. The basic 
hypothesis - that small producers have a comparative disadvantage in the compliance process 




the costs and benefits of compliance, which are the two main determinants of the compliance 
process. 
The methodical framework of the paper, which enables the problem to be examined 
systematically, is structured into four analytical stages. The first stage explores whether small 
producers independently comply with the standard. The second analyzes how small producers 
may comply with the standard, but only with the support of a downstream actor in the 
marketing chain. The third stage discusses the effect that a growing dependency of small 
producers on downstream actors could have, and the fourth stage investigates whether 
exclusion from high-quality standard markets would be problematic for small producers. In an 
extensive literature review the empirical evidence is structured according to the analytical 
framework. The paper finds that small and medium producers rarely comply if they do not 
receive any support from downstream actors. In cases where there are well-educated and 
relatively wealthy farmers, forward integration can also be found. No empirical support exists 
for the intuitively appealing hypothesis of a lower cost of compliance per unit of output for 
large producers.  
Overall, available case studies concentrate on a rather general impact of standards on the 
agricultural and food sector. They rarely present any farm-specific analyses, and the 
compliance process is largely neglected. The case study of the Moroccan tomato sector, which 
covers the last two papers of this thesis, aims to particularly address these shortcomings.  
The Moroccan tomato sector was chosen as the case study for two reasons. First, the EU and 
Morocco maintain lengthy and close trading relations. For several decades now, more than 
90% of tomato exports have gone to the EU. Morocco is covered by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and, as the only country in the world, has the possibility to export tomatoes under 
a preferential entry price to the EU. The outstanding importance of the EU as a Moroccan 
trading partner leads to the fact that all demand changes – whether they might stem from EU 
import policy changes or from private EU trading partners – directly lead to observable 
changes on the Moroccan supply side. Second, a wide range of producers are involved in the 
sector, from large-scale plantations cultivating more than 200 ha to small producers with less 
than 10 ha. This opens up the possibility to analyze and compare the impact of standards on 
different producer groups.  
The first paper, entitled “EU Trade Preferences for Moroccan Tomato Exports – Who 




standards on developing countries’ stakeholders. It provides a detailed breakdown of the 
Moroccan tomato sector including the socioeconomic, institutional and political environment. 
It provides the necessary background information for a detailed case study of the Moroccan 
tomato sector. From a Moroccan perspective, tomato exports are of special importance due to 
their high share in agricultural production and trade. In addition, the sector is of particular 
social importance as it offers income possibilities to those with little access to land, and 
moreover, provides possibilities of employment in rural areas where there tend to be few other 
alternative jobs.  
The Moroccan agricultural sector includes about 1.5 million farms (WTO, 2003) of which 
about 8,000 produce early vegetables and only 400 produce export tomatoes. Around 30% of 
tomato producers are small scale farmers who cultivate less than 5 ha. Their production area 
represents only about 10-15% of the total production area for early tomatoes. The majority of 
the producers cultivate an area between 5-20 ha. Farms belonging to this group cultivate 
around 50% of the total tomato area. Only 10-15% of the farms are larger than 20 ha, but they 
represent around 40% of the early tomato area. The production and marketing chain can be 
subdivided into three major levels: the production or farm level, the processing level and the 
exporting level. The largest part of the production (between 75 – 90%) is produced in 
integrated or semi- integrated supply chains. 
The EU applies a complex system of preferences for tomato imports from Morocco. 
Quantities are fixed and serve as entry price quotas and tariff rate quotas at the same time. 
The paper puts particular emphasis on providing empirical evidence of 1) the existence of an 
economic rent under the EU preferential scheme for tomato imports from Morocco, and 2) the 
distribution of that rent.  
Based on an analysis of the Moroccan Standard Import Values (SIVs) as reported by the 
European Commission, as indicators for the Moroccan import price and empirical data on the 
Moroccan production costs, the paper provides evidence for a rent of about €22 - 37 million 
per year. This equates to 16-24% of the total export value of Moroccan tomatoes to the EU. 
Due to the structure of the Moroccan export sector as well as the EU method of allocating 
import licenses, it is likely that a large part of the quota rent ends up on the Moroccan side 
and that a dissipation of the rent within physical rent-seeking activities is limited.  
It is expected that negotiations on market access in the current Doha Round will result in a 




erosion of the rent. Furthermore, an additional erosion of the rent may take place due to 
increasing production costs caused by higher product or processing standards, e.g. the 
EUREPGAP certification.  
The fourth paper, entitled “The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on 
Primary Producer Level: A Case Study of the EUREPGAP Standard in the Moroccan 
Tomato Sector”, addresses the compliance decision process of Moroccan tomato producers 
with the EUREPGAP standard. Certification with the EUREPGAP standard has become a 
major requirement for participation in the EU tomato market. For some producers, the 
EUREPGAP standard opens up new opportunities as it permits access to particular market 
segments. At the same time, the increasing demand for private certification is accompanied by 
marginalization and exclusion, as standards impose prohibitively high barriers for certain 
producers in terms of the short-term and long-term efforts that have to be undertaken for 
production under certification. In order to understand whether there are certain groups of 
producers which are affected by the EUREPGAP standard in a particular manner, the paper 
provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the compliance decision behavior and the 
compliance process. The survey analyzes drivers for a positive or negative compliance 
decision by comparing the determinants of the decision process of non-certified producers 
with those of certified ones. 
For its explanatory approach, this paper mainly draws on the theories of innovation adoption 
and diffusion research, since these make it possible to systemize the decision process and 
integrate it into a close network of economic, social and institutional determinants.  
Research data was collected in 2006 by conducting semi-structured interviews with 63 
Moroccan tomato producers in the region of Souss Massa. The survey concentrates on the 
EUREPGAP standards as EUREPGAP has turned out to be the most important private 
certificate at the farm level in trading relations with EU partners.  
One of the most important results of the survey is that being small in size seems to be 
overvalued in the scientific discussion, especially when talking about the technical upgrading 
costs that farms may have to invest. Even though very large farms tend to become certified to 
a larger extent than smaller ones, the results do not suggest that small producers are 
particularly disadvantaged in the compliance process, as farm size correlates only marginally 




Instead, the results rather point to the fact that less-organized or less integrated farmers tend to 
make a “non-compliance” decision. Forward integration tends to be of particular importance 
because it opens up the direct access to information on the buyers’ requirements. The vertical 
information flow plays a major role in the motivation to become certified. Non-integrated 
producers mainly depend on horizontal information from other producers regarding market 
developments within the EU. However, the results of the case study support the fact that 
vertically integrated producers have little interest in sharing the necessary information with 
non-integrated producers and, through this, keeping them within the market by providing 
them with information on particular market developments.  
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Abstract  
Developing countries’ market access to international agricultural markets is increasingly 
determined by the ability to respect their trading partner’s food safety and quality standards. 
Empirical evidence on the particular impact of standards on developing countries’ trade flows 
is still limited. This paper analyses two questions. 1) How do developing countries export 
shares develop differently under the particular importance of standards and 2) is it possible to 
empirically assess the particular impact of standards on trade performance? Regarding the 
first question, cluster analysis groups countries according to their trade performance into those 
which manage to increase market share and those which lose market share, respectively. The 
analysis of how food safety standards influence this trend towards market concentration is 
subject of the second part of the paper. For the analysis the concept of “SPS capacity” was 





In an increasingly liberalized agricultural trading environment, the debate on better market 
access for developing countries’ agricultural exports cannot be separated from the discussion 
of the effects of food and agricultural standards on the export capability of developing 
countries.  
Since standards define rules and conditions for participation in international markets, they 
lead to a process of redistribution among countries, regions and stakeholders (Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005). The overall concern prevailing in the scientific discussion is that of developing 
countries losing market share due to their typically weaker public food safety and quality 
management systems as well as their technically less advanced systems of production 
(Henson and Jaffee, 2006).  
However, empirical evidence on the particular impact of standards on developing countries’ 
trade flows is still limited. Available surveys are mainly case studies which analyze the 
impact of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on trade flows of individual developing 
countries’ export sectors (e.g. Aloui and Kenny, 2005; Henson et al. 2000; Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2006; Minten et al. 2006; World Bank, 2005). Little quantitative research is 
available (among these are, for example, de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006; Disdier et al., 
2007; Moenius, 1999; Moenius, 2006; Wieck, 2006; Yang and Woo, 2005,) and finally, little 
research exists which leads to a more differentiated and comparative perspective of the impact 
of agricultural and food standards among the group of developing countries. Available 
literature which aims to provide a more detailed perspective on this is mainly based on 
theoretical considerations or draws a synthesis of the existing case studies within a common 
analytical framework (e.g. Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003; Frohberg et al. 2006; Henson 
and Jaffee, 2006; Maertens and Swinnen, 2006, Taylor and Wilson, 2008).  
To shed more light on this issue, the objective of the paper is to analyze the question of how 
developing countries perform within a trading environment that is determined by the 
increasing importance of food and agricultural standards. In a first step, the paper evaluates in 
an exploratory manner the trade flows of developing countries within the new trading 
environment. We are in particular interested in the question how countries are affected 
differently by standards. Hence, the analysis classifies countries according to their trade 




share, respectively. In order to do so, the paper analyzes the development of exports from 
developing countries to OCED countries (which were perceived as the most important 
standard setters) between two time spans – from 1993 to 1995 and from 2002 to 2004. Within 
these two time spans the importance of food standards for international agricultural trade 
increased dramatically. The analysis concentrates on two commodity groups that are strongly 
influenced by standards - fruits/ vegetables and meat.  
In a second step the paper aims to empirically assess the particular impact of standards on 
trade performance. We therefore introduced the concept of “SPS capacity” in a gravity model. 
SPS capacity is described using five variables: 1) Border rejections, 2) SPS activity (a) trade 
concerns and b) SPS committee attendance, 3) the number of EUREPGAP
3
 certified 
producers in the country, 4) investments by the Standards and Trade Development Facility 
(STDF). All these variables have been chosen as the best available indicators to express a 
countries commitment, interest and effort made to comply with its trading partners’ 
requirements. Since data availability is limited, most data has been developed by the authors. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework for the 
analysis. Laying out the analytical course of the paper, the section is divided into two 
subsections. While the first subsection “trade under the particular perspective of standards” 
describes the exploratory framework, the method and the data for the analysis of the trade 
flows, the second subsection “determinants of trade” does so for the gravity model. Section 3 
again is twofold and presents the results of each analysis step. Section 4 draws final 
conclusions.  
6 Analytical Framework 
Introducing the concept of our analysis, we begin with exploring the costs of complying with 
food safety standards
4
. The compliance with food safety regulations involves costs for the 
foreign supplier in terms of an augmentation of the cost of production. Systematically, cost of 
compliance can be subdivided into different components. First, they may be differentiated 
according to their appearance - either on a public or on a private level. Public costs of 
                                                 
3 The EUREPGAP standard is the most important private food standard for the EU market. It was developed 
by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group.  
4 Food safety is an integral part of food quality. Food quality includes various different quality aspects such 
as: the technical value, the sensory quality, the nutritional value and all aspects of food safety, as well as the 
idealistic and psychological values of a product (Brockmeier, 1993; Wiegand, 1997). It is the responsibility 




compliance arise for the establishment and maintenance of a national food quality 
management system. This may, amongst others, include the cost of installing and maintaining 
a competence authority, control and certification mechanisms, pest management strategies 
and the upgrading of laboratories. Private costs of compliance arise for the private supplier on 
each level of the value chain. According to Chemnitz et al. (2007), private cost of compliance 
can be classified into five major components: physical upgrading, human capital upgrading, 
management, higher variable production costs, lower yields and higher social costs.  
Both, the public and the private costs of compliance, are mainly borne by the supply side. 
This results from the fact that legal food safety requirements of the importing countries are 
considered to be public goods (Wiegand, 1997). Safe food is defined by a certain tolerable 
level of hazards in food. To ensure a particular safety level, goods which exceed the national 
tolerable level of hazard are not allowed to enter the country’s market. Hence, for products 
complying with this minimum level of food safety, no additional willingness to pay arises on 
the consumer side.  
As legal food and agricultural standards change the cost of production, they consequently also 
change the competitiveness of countries. Following plausibility considerations it is assumed 
that the countries who are enlarging their market share show lower costs regarding 
compliance in relation to other exporters. These redistributional effects were assumed to lead 
to supply shifts over time. In sum, we assume that potential trade effects of food safety 
measures can be observed in a comparison of trade flows in the respective periods and 
markets.
5
 A priori we assume that the group of developing countries can not be treated 
homogeneously and that small scale exporters will lose market shares while large scale 
exporter will manage to increase their market share. To which extent changes in market shares 
can be followed back to the impact of standards will be analyzed in the gravity model.  
                                                 
5 A similar approach was undertaken by Wieck and Rudloff (2007) in an analysis of trade impacts of 




6.1 Trade under the particular perspective of standards 
 “Weaker economic players, including smaller countries, enterprises and farmers will be 
further marginalized” (UNCTAD; 2005). 
“The investment and recurrent ‘costs of compliance’ could undermine the competitive 
position of developing countries” (Jaffee,S., Henson, S.; 2004) 
In the literature, the group of developing countries is still treated relatively homogeneously 
regarding the impact of food standards on their export ability. Yet we are particularly 
interested in the question of how standards affect developing countries differently. Which 
countries managed to increase their export share in the time period under consideration and 
which countries lost market share? Being a bit provocative, we have named all countries that 
managed to increase their export performance more than the average “winners” and labeled 
all countries which lost market shares as “losers”. 
6.1.1 Research design - analytical step I 
In order to understand the evolution of developing countries’ trade performance and its 
particular relation to standards, the analysis focuses on (1) the years 1993-1995 and 2002-
2004. During this period the importance of food safety standards in agricultural trade 
increased significantly. (2) Trade flows from developing countries to OECD countries are 
chosen since the latter are considered to be the most important standard setters. (3) The 
analysis concentrates on the export values of meat and fruits/ vegetables as these products are 
particularly affected by food safety standards.  
In the following we explain all three elements of this research design in detail.  
1) The reason for choosing these two time spans is the tremendous increase of recognition that 
food standards received between these periods in international agricultural trade (Athukorala 
and Jayasuriya, 2003; de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006; Henson and Jaffee, 2006; Jaffee and 
Henson 2004; Josling et. al 2004; Maertens and Swinnen, 2006; Moenius, 2006; Roberts and 
Krisshoff, 2004). Apart from the empirical observations found in the literature, a quantitative 
indicator of the growing importance of food standards in international trade is the number of 
SPS notifications to the WTO. Even though the WTO notifications, as such, are a likely  
conservative indicator of the effects of SPS measures on trade flows (Moenius, 2006; Roberts 
and Krisshoff, 2004),
 
their strong augmentation may nevertheless underline the prominent 




Annual notifications more than tripled from less than 200 notifications in 1995 to a total 
number of 617 in 2005 (WTO, 2002a, WTO, 2003, WTO 2005a). 
2) The analytical framework includes developing countries’ exports to OECD countries since 
these are seen as being the most important “standard setters”.
67
 While in 1995 nearly all SPS 
notifications to the WTO came from the OECD countries (OECD, 2002), developing 
countries now contribute at least one quarter to today's SPS notifications. Principally, only 
59% of all WTO members notified at least one SPS measure to the WTO 1995 and nearly half 
of all notifications during the last ten years came either from the US or from the EU (WTO, 
2005a).  
3) The fruit /vegetable and the meat sector were chosen because of their particular relevance 
regarding food safety
8
 (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). In the last decade, several importing 
countries lowered the level of detection for pesticide residues on fruit and vegetables to a zero 
tolerance limit or principally tightened the residue level (Chemnitz and Günther, 2007). In the 
meat sector, certification requirements were intensified as a result of several food scandals 
and epidemics at the beginning of the new millennium. Today, all countries where meat 
originates must be on a positive list of eligible countries for that particular product. Amongst 
others, the eligibility criteria are that the country of origin must have a competent veterinary 
authority which must guarantee the relevant hygiene standards through inspection and 
certification as well as having a monitoring system in place to verify compliance with EU 
requirements. In addition to the increasing stringency of food standards regarding these 
products the markets for fruits/ vegetables and meat are of specific importance for many 
developing countries. The average share of developing countries in these two markets ranges 
from 35 to nearly 40% market share for fruit/ vegetable products and around 16-18% for meat 
products with a slight upward tendency since 1998 (FAO, 2006).  
                                                 
6 In this respect, it would be interesting to compare the development of exports from South to North with 
those from South to South, or from South to East, thus in countries where standards are not as strict. 
However, this was not analyzed due to lack of adequate data. 
7 For reasons of better data quality, imports by OECD countries from each developing country are used to 
describe developing countries’ exports. 
8 The only other commodity groups which are not included in the analysis, but are important sectors 
regarding the impact of SPS measures, are fish and seafood products. With respect to the very low quality of 




6.1.2 Methods and data 
The analysis of trade flows is conducted with the objective of revealing patterns within the 
dynamics in the export performance of countries. We employ cluster analysis to group 
developing countries according to their dynamics in export performance within both the fruit 
and vegetable and the meat sector. The method of cluster analysis can be used for an 
exploratory, empirical classification of objects according to their similarity. The analysis is 
conducted for the two commodity groups separately. This paper uses the Ward method to 
determine the number of clusters (based on the increase in the agglomeration level between 
two solutions) and the K-Means algorithm to determine the final partition. Homogeneity of 
clusters and stability of the solutions are assessed through the proportion of variance of single 
(z-standardized) variables within clusters compared to those in the whole sample (F-value) 
(Backhaus, 2000) and a Rand index measuring the proportion of consistent allocations 
(Bacher, 1996).  
Three variables for each sector are used in the cluster analyses: 1) the "ratio" and 2) the 
"difference" of export volumes between the two time spans (1993-1995 and 2002-2004) and 
3) the "coefficient of variation" during the second period. All variables are calculated from 
OECD country imports recorded in the PCTAS
9
 database. Three-year averages are used to 
level out extremes in single years. The ratio of exports in 1993-1995 compared to 2002-2004 
describes the dynamics of export performance without taking into consideration the absolute 
level of exports. However, the ratio is sensitive to the absolute volume of trade as, for 
example, a doubling of exports starting from a very low initial value is much more likely to 
occur. The second variable, therefore, describes the difference between the average values of 
exports for the respective commodity group in 1993-1995 and 2002-2004. It takes into 
account the absolute level of exports. With this variable it is especially the large countries 
relatively small percentage changes in export value which are captured better, if one looks at 
the absolute value. In the cluster analysis, the logarithm of the difference is used as the 
variable has a high skewness. Finally, the coefficient of variation is calculated for the period 
                                                 
9 The sample consists of 67 countries in the case of the fruit and vegetable market and 48 countries in the 
case of the meat market. Countries for which no data was available in the full first period were excluded 
from the analysis. For the remaining countries, missing data in single years in PCTAS were treated as a 
trade volume of 0. More than half of all developing countries were not included in the analysis because of a 
lack of data. For the member states of the Southern African Customs Union, Eurostat data was used instead 
of PCTAS data for figures on meat trade (and countries were excluded from the analysis of the fruit and 
vegetable market, as meat plays a the much stronger role for these countries) as data is not available for 




2002-2004 to gain an idea about the stability of exports coming from a country. It would be 
interesting to compare the variability in the two time spans, but the variable has several 
missing values in the first period if single years are not reported and this therefore would 
reduce the sample.  
We are aware of the fact that variation in trade flows can be induced by various factors and 
that it would be too simplistic to dedicate it to standards alone. Therefore, the analysis aims to 
test the impact of standards on trade flows, thus correcting for other determinants of trade 
flows. The following section describes a model of determinants of trade flows and variables 
reflecting the potential impact of standards on global trade flows.  
6.2 Determinants of Trade 
“Compliance costs undermine the comparative advantage of developing countries in high-
value food trade” (UNCTAD, 2005). 
“It is evident that developing countries are constrained in their ability to export agricultural 
and food products to developed countries by SPS requirements” (Henson, no year). 
In the literature, food standards are seen as one of the major determinants for market access. 
Nevertheless, little empirical evidence exists on the particular impact of standards on 
agricultural trade. Hence, we are interested in the question if it is possible to show the impact 
of food safety standards on developing countries’ agricultural trade empirically. We aim to 
answer the question whether the SPS capacity of a country has a significant impact on the 
development of its export shares.  
6.2.1  Research design - analytical step II 
In order to analyze the impact of standards on trade flows, we propose the concept of SPS 
capacity and test its impact on trade flows. A country’s SPS capacity depends on the public 
capacity to meet the institutional requirements and to provide the relevant institutional 
infrastructure as well as the private efforts which were undertaken in order to meet 
international food safety requirements. In order to make the SPS capacity of individual 
countries comparable we developed five indicators as explained below (see Table 1).  
Due to limited data availability for SPS related information; the analysis concentrates on the 
EU market for fruit and vegetables in the year 2004. Even though this limits the validity, the 




importer of fruit and vegetable products from developing countries and, at the same, time fruit 
and vegetables were among the most important export products of developing countries.  
6.2.2 Methods and data 
The analysis of the impact of SPS capacity on trade flows is performed by means of 
regression analysis in a gravity model. The gravity model has been widely used for the 
analysis of similar questions; e.g. the trade effects of food safety regulations (Disdier 2007; 
Moenius 2006; Otsuki et al. 2001a and b, Wilson and Otsuki 2004) and of intellectual 
property rights (Yang and Woo 2006)). The gravity model predicts bilateral trade flows based 
on country characteristics of both, exporters and importers, including income (assuming that 
countries with a higher GDP per capita trade more, due to better capital endowment and 
infrastructure), population (scale effects or market size), distance between country pairs 
(transportation costs) and factors that distort trade (e.g. tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade). In 
international economics the gravity model is seen as being the most successful estimation 
technique to analyze trade flows empirically (Rauch and Trindade 1999). We use a simplified 
specification of the gravity model. In this model we include “standard” gravity variables as 




Table 1: Model determinants to describe international agricultural trade 
Variable  Indicator  Definition Source 
Control 
variables 
GDP (per capita) Per capita real gross domestic 
product of exporting country  
World development indicators, 
World Bank (2006) 
Population Population of exporting country  World development indicators, 
World Bank (2006) 
Distance Geographic distance between 
exporting country and the European 
Union 
Glick and Rose (2002) 
Colonial history Dummy variable. X= 1 If country i 
shares a colonial history with a 
Member state of the European 
Union  
Glick and Rose (2002) 
Level of trade 
preferences 
Difference between market access 
possibilities of the preferential 
country and the MFN regulations.  
Own compilation based on : 
Candau and Jean (2006); Grethe 
et al. 2005; Francoise et al. 
2006; Yu and Jensen, 2005; 




Border rejections  Number of events of rejection at EU 
border of food imports (fruits and 
vegetables). 
Own compilation based on : 
RASFF 2006  
(www.http://ec.europa.eu/food/f
ood/rapidalert/index_en.htm).  
SPS activity I: 
- Attendance in 
SPS 
committee 
Number of attended SPS 
committee meetings between 
2000 and 2003. Not counting the 
number of delegates per country.  
Own compilation based on : 
WTO (various issues)  
SPS activity II:  
- Trade 
concerns 
Number of trade concerns raised by 
a county in the SPS at the SPS 
committee in 2004.  
Own compilation based on : 
WTO (various issues) 
EUREPGAP 
certification  
Number of EUREPGAP certified 
producers (fruits and exports) 
Unpublished information 2006 




Source: own elaboration 
First, the table depicts the gravity control variables. Following Glick and Rose (2002), we 
include the GDP of the exporting country, population of the exporting country, distance 




country, and therefore have only one importing “country”, the variables distance and colonial 
history taken from Glick and Rose are aggregated: To determine the distance (colonial 
history) between EU and any developing country, we consider the distance to the closest 
(common colonial history with any) EU country.  
As additional control variables we include tariff barriers to trade. While the overall level of 
tariff barriers is surely of major importance for trade flows, in a comparison of country pairs, 
bilateral and multilateral trade preferences are the most distinguishing feature. We construct 
ordinal variables on a scale of one to three, capturing the level of trade preferences between 
country pairs.  
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the five variables we developed to represent a country’s SPS 
capacity and thus test the impact of standards on international trade. The SPS capacity of a 
country includes 1) the number of border rejections, 2) a country’s “SPS activity” revealed by 
a) the trade concerns it announces in the SPS committee and b) its attendance in the WTO 
SPS committee meetings, 3) investment by the Standards and Trade Development Facility 
(STDF) and 4) the number of private certification activities. Each variable is described below. 
1. Border rejections: Border rejections are indicators of food safety and quality problems, 
as they are always linked to an export country’s inability to comply with the importing 
countries’ requirements.
10
 Information on border rejections related to food safety and health 
concerns is rare. Data for the EU is available since 2001 (since the implementation of the 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF)). 
11
 
                                                 
10
 Border rejections take place for two different reasons: 1) Shortcomings in the food safety and quality 
management systems. 2) Export concentration on products which faced a particular increase in food safety 
measures. As a consequence, the exporting country has to adopt the new requirements. 
11 Information for the US market is only available for 2005/06. According to a survey of the FAO 





Figure 1: EU information on total border rejections 1999-2004 
Source: own illustration, (RASFF, 2002; RASFF, 2003; RASFF 2004)  
As depicted in Figure 3, the number of border rejections increased heavily from 698 in 1999 
to 5562 in 2004. Information by the RASFF is twofold. First, it provides information on 
border rejections (information notifications). These products were not able to enter the EU 
market. Second, the RASFF provides information on products which do not comply with EU 
norms, but have already entered the EU market (alert notifications). The number of alert 
notifications rose during the time period from only 97 in 1999 to 691 in 2004. Additionally, 
information notifications increased during the same time from 263 to 1897.  
The variable has a shortcoming as the border cases do not indicate how many tons or 
kilograms were involved in each rejection. However, the variable provides a rough indication 
of a country’s capacity to satisfy the SPS requirements of its trading partners.  
2. The SPS activity of a country: The “SPS activity” includes two sub-components. First, 
the attendance of a country at the WTO SPS committee meetings between 2000 and 2003. 
Therefore, the lists of participants at WTO SPS committee meetings were assessed. We count 
the attendance of a delegation in each year, though not accounting for the number of delegates 
per country.  
Second, the SPS activity is proxied by the number of trade concerns. Trade concerns make it 
possible for countries to attract attention and initiate discussion about a particular concern 
without using the official WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The increasing importance of 
SPS measures for international trade is depicted by the number of trade concerns raised within 
the SPS committee meetings. Since the implementation of the SPS Agreement altogether 204 
trade concerns were raised until 2004 (WTO, 2005a). Only 56 trade concerns have been 
reported to be resolved in the total period. During the indicated period developed countries 
raised specific trade concerns 143 times, followed by 101 cases of trade concerns coming 
from developing countries. Only two least-developed countries raised specific trade concerns 




3. EUREPGAP certification: This variable differs from the former ones as it focuses on a 
private standard instead of legal SPS measures. EUREPGAP is the acronym for the Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP) developed by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group 
(EUREP). The standard mainly refers to fresh fruit and vegetables. Even though this private 
certificate has become more and more significant in the last decade, it has only recently 
turned out to become a quasi mandatory certificate for imports to the European market. 
Unfortunately, only data on certified producers is available and not on the quantity of the 
certified products nor on the certified areas planted.  
4. STDF investment: Donor investment in food safety issues is explored in order to 
depict SPS capacity development activities. The Standard and Trade Development Facility 
(STDF) is a financing and a coordination mechanism at the same time. It provides grants for 
developing countries in order to comply with SPS standards, thereby increasing or 
maintaining their market access. Until August 2003 (which is the last online update of the 
STDF database) funding was granted to 151 different developing countries, 46 of them are 
LDCs. Only three LDCs did not receive a grant. The total grants amounted to more than $ 8.5 
billion. Kenya is with more than $ 3 billion by far the top receiving country of STDF grants, 
followed by Iran (649 million), Pakistan (410 million) and the two LDC countries Nepal (371 
million) and Bhutan (386 million). Nevertheless, 25 LDCs are ranked at the end of the 




The econometric specification of the model is  
Log (Expi) = b0 + b1log(Disi)  + b2log(Popi) + b3log(GDPpci) +  b4DCol+ b5((PrefEU) +  
b6PrefUS + b7log(Reject) + b8(SPScom) + b9log(Tradecon) + b10Log(CertFarms) + 
b11log(STDFinv) + εi.  
where i stands for the exporting country. Parameters bx are coefficients, εi is the error term. 
Exp denotes the export volume from country i to the European Union. Variable names are 
those in table 1.  
For the regression analysis we employ ordinary least square estimation. Since our sample is 
rather small (n=65) and components of SPS capacity are correlated amongst each other, we 
proceed stepwise, testing first a base model with different specifications, and then the impact 
of single proxies for SPS capacity. 
The following section presents the results of both analytical steps. It begins in section 3.1 with 
the discussion of the cluster analysis and turns in section 3.2 to the discussion of the gravity 
model.  
7 Results  
7.1 Export performance of developing countries in meat and fruits/ 
vegetables sectors 
Regarding the cluster analysis it has to be noted that for both sectors the data does not have a 
perfectly clear cluster structure for the chosen variables.
12
 However, we regard them as the 
best available indicators of export performance. The exploratory nature of cluster analysis 
possibly contradicts our assumptions about categories such as “winners” and “losers” – there 
might be groupings found through cluster analysis which are somewhat difficult to interpret 
as the clusters are comprised of both minor losers and minor winners. With regard to the 
overall objective of the analysis, we put emphasis on distinguishing between “losers” and 
                                                 
12 This became clear from instabilities of solutions using the K-Means algorithm depending on which of the 
different clustering variables had a higher contribution to the clustering (this can be read from the F-value, 
calculated by ANOVA to estimate how strongly each variable contributes to the classification). Giving 
higher priority to a certain variable cannot be forced in a cluster analysis (unless variables are given 
different weights), but we considered the F-values in the choice of the number of clusters in the way that the 





“winners” as clearly as possible. The analysis begins with a cluster analysis of the fruit/ 
vegetable sector and continues on with the analysis of the meat sector. 
Table 2 depicts the results of the cluster analysis that focused on the fruit/ vegetable sector. 
Clusters are arranged by the mean “difference” of exports volume, thus the largest exporting 
winners are listed first. Clusters were labeled according to the most important characteristics 
of the groups which can be read from the means of the clustering variables in each cluster 
group. The table only depicts “examples” of countries which were included in the cluster. The 
cluster membership tables can be found in the Annex. All clusters are homogenous as defined 








Cluster label Examples No. of 
countries 
Mean of clustering variables 
Difference 














Chile, Costa Rica 
4 1404928 1.8 0.2 





9 337274 1.6 0.1 
5 Medium scale 
exporters, very 
strong winners 
Peru, Ghana, Zambia,  7 69038 3.7 0.2 





4 10859 3.7 0.4 





18 33971 1.8 0.2 
1 Very small scale; 
strong winners 
Niger, Nepal 2 375 2.8 0.8 





6 (5) 565 0.8 0.4 





Gambia, Sri Lanka 
16 -16141 0.9 0.2 
9 Large scale 
exporter; strong 
looser 
 Thailand 1 -239517 0.82 0.2 
Source: own calculation 
For the interpretation of the clusters we took the overall export dynamics in the market for the 
group of all developing countries into consideration. Consequently, when comparing the 
country ratios to the ratio of all exports of developing countries to the OECD, a ratio of fruit/ 
vegetable exports in 2002-04 compared to 1993-95 above 1.4 indicates an increase of exports 




The first cluster explored in table 2, cluster 8, includes a small group of the countries with the 
largest export quantity and, in total values, the most strongly expanding exporters. The cluster 
consists of the four countries China, Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica. These countries almost 
doubled their exports starting from an already high export quantity in the first period. Mexico 
and China clearly dominate OECD fruit and vegetable imports. They account for more than 
30% of total fruit /vegetable imports from developing countries in OECD countries in the 
years 2001 to 2004. Another 10 countries with a market share between 10 and 2% supply 
more than 50% of the OECD fruit vegetable imports from developing countries. These 
countries are mainly found in cluster 7. The cluster consists of 9 countries which increased 
their market share by an average of 1.6. It is rather plausible that most of the already large 
exporters managed to increase their market share significantly. Taking into account the 
current debate on market concentration, it is particularly interesting that smaller exporters also 
managed to increase their market share. The countries included in the clusters 5, 4, 3 and 1 
have a market share of less than 2% of total fruit/ vegetable exports to OECD countries, but 
some of them increased their market share tremendously when looking at it in relative terms. 
Although the clusters 4 and 5 are relatively heterogeneous according to the export volume of 
the countries included, we can describe them as medium scale exporters with very strong 
gains in market share.
13
 In cluster 5, all medium scale exporters tripled their market share 
between the two time periods. A similar scenario can be observed in cluster 4, even though it 
is a much smaller export quantity here.
14
 Except for Bolivia, all three other countries of the 
cluster more than tripled their market share, even though they had a relatively high coefficient 
of variation, the cost being instable exports. Cluster 3 includes 18 small and medium scale 
exporters which managed to increase their market share. The cluster is rather heterogeneous, 
and the ratio ranges between 1.25 and 2.55. Finally, cluster 1 includes Nepal and Niger, two 
LDCs which managed to nearly triple their market share; however, they did start out with a 
very small quantity.  
The remaining clusters include countries which lost market share. Cluster 2, consisting of 6 
countries, of which Madagascar was the only country which managed to increase its market 
share (therefore Madagascar does not fit well into this cluster). The mean for this cluster is 
                                                 
13 In cluster 5 Peru has a trade volume which is more than three times larger than the export volume of the 
second large exporter of the cluster.  
14 The difference of the cluster is strongly dominated by the relatively large scale exporter Bolivia which -  




therefore somewhat misleading for the interpretation. All other countries of the cluster lost 
market share, however in relatively small total quantity. Cluster 6 includes 16 medium to 
small scale exporters which lost market share.
15
 Major losers in total terms were Iran, Panama 
and St. Lucia as well as Indonesia. The only very large scale producer that lost heavily when 
it comes to market share within the two time spans is Thailand. Considering the large market 
share of Thailand the strong decrease is especially notable.  
The coefficient of variation yielded little additional information. In most clusters, variation 
between single years in the second period is rather low. It is higher in the smaller, more 
dynamic clusters. Interestingly, stronger variation within the fruit and vegetable market is not 
a characteristic that defines the loser clusters, as could be expected, if countries with low SPS 
capacity are less able to stabilize their exports.  
Overall, results of the analysis show that very different development patterns can be observed 
for fruit/ vegetable exports. Some general trends are: (1) All large scale exporters are winners, 
except for Thailand. (2) Within the group of small and medium scale exporters we find a 
larger group of winners than of losers. We find the same diverse structure within the group of 
LDCs. (3) We find rather stable exports in the second time span, especially when comparing 
the coefficient of variation to the one we will observe within the meat market. Thus, even 
though the market of fruits and vegetables is heavily dominated by a few major players, 
various small countries increased their market share during the last decade. Consequently, 
results of the analysis hint to the fact that SPS measures in the sector did not simply 
strengthen the competitiveness of large producers and impede the competitiveness of small 
ones. Results of the analysis mainly contradict the a priori hypothesis of small scale exporters 
losing market share due to the SPS requirements of their trading partners.  
The cluster analysis for meat shows very different results. The sample is smaller for meat 
exports (n=46) as a large proportion of developing countries does not export meat to the 
OECD at all, or only in certain single years. Additionally, the coefficient of variation in meat 
exports is much higher than the one for fruit/ vegetable exports, indicating in turn a higher 
instability within this market. The meat exports of all countries under consideration increased 
by 1.6 during the two time spans. Again, this is the benchmark against which we label a 
cluster as a “loser” or a “winner”. 
                                                 




We chose an eight cluster solution as the best available result, even though the solution does 
not very clearly distinguish winners and losers. Statistically, all clusters are homogeneous. 
However, for ease of interpretation, we propose a slightly different grouping, relocating a few 
countries into clusters where they fit a bit better in order to more clearly describe winners and 
losers. The respective cluster summaries are displayed in parentheses for the regrouped 
clusters. Cluster memberships are displayed in Table 3. 




Cluster label Examples No. of 
countries 
Mean of clustering variables 
Difference 











4 (extremely strong large 
scale winner) 
 Chile 1 296180 23.0 0.5 
7 (very strong very large 
scale winner) 
Brazil 1 1085546 2.2 0.3 




3 296106 2.9 0.1 




3 3510 14.7 0.2 
1 (strong small scale 
winner) 
Philippines, Algeria,  
Mozambique, Niger 
4 414 4.4 1.1 
3 (Strong medium scale 
loser) 
Nicaragua, Indonesia 18 -5301 0.9 0.4 
5 (Medium scale loser) Guatemala, 
Honduras, Uganda 
16 -5389 0.4 1.2 
2 (Strong very large scale 
loser) 
Argentina 1 -235568 0.7 0.2 
Source: own calculation 
The overall export structure of the meat sector is even more concentrated than in the fruit and 
vegetable sector. Results of the cluster analysis nicely underline the assumed strong 
concentration process taking place within the meat market. The two major winners are Chile 
and Brazil (the first in relative, the latter in total terms). Chile (Cluster 4) increased its exports 
to OECD countries by more than 20 times and Brazil managed to double its market share, 




Brazil alone supplies 38% of the total OECD meat imported from developing countries. The 
other three top players of the meat market are included in cluster 6 (Thailand, Mexico and 
China). The high ratio of the cluster is mainly dominated by the increasing exports of Mexico 
(5.1). Thailand and China, though, also nearly doubled their exports within the relevant 
period. These five countries alone supply more than 80% of developing countries’ total export 
to the OECD in the last decade. No other country has an export share of more than 5%.  
Similar to the analysis of the fruit and vegetable market, it is not particularly astonishing that 
the already large scale exporters increased their market share. However, this analysis again 
provided some results which contradict the a priori assumptions. The clusters 8 and 1, for 
example, show that not all small scale exporters lost market shares in the period under 
consideration. Both clusters include small scale to very small scale exporters which even 
managed to increase their exports strongly; even though at a low total quantity. Malaysia, 
Cote d’Ivoire and India (cluster 8) showed a very strong increase of their exports and even 
countries such as Niger, Mozambique and the Philippines showed a positive ratio (on average 
4.4). As countries such as Niger and Mozambique were principally considered to have weak 
food quality safety systems, the question arises as to why these countries managed to increase 
their market share in contrast to countries with already existing trading relations. However, 
when taken in total numbers, more countries lost market share in the meat sector in 
comparison to those who managed to increase their market share.  
The clusters 3, 5 and 2 of Table 3 depict those countries which lost market share.
16
 Cluster 3 
and cluster 5 include 36 countries, the largest share of our sample in the meat market, which 
lost market share quite heavily. All of these are small scale exporting countries. Only cluster 2 
includes a large scale exporter loser. Argentina is the only large country which shows losses 
on a very high level – in relative as well as in absolute terms.  
In order to compare the results of the analyses of the two sectors, we had a look at them by 
cross tabulating the winners and the losers.  
                                                 
16 Morocco, Ecuador and Fiji do not fit well into the structure of the cluster as these two countries actually 




Table 4: Cross-tabulation of “losers” and “winners” in the meat and the fruit/ vegetable 
market 
 No cluster Meat loser / winner Total 
Loser winner 
FV loser / 
winner 
Loser 9 11 7 27 
Winner 13 20 7 40 
Total 22 31 14 67 
Source: own calculation  
As can be seen in Table 5, only 11 countries of the 45 countries considered in both cluster 
analyses are losers in both, the meat and the fruit/ vegetable market. However, only 7 
countries are winners in both markets. 27 countries are winners in one market and losers in 
the other market. Overall the meat sector contains more losers than the vegetable market. 
Only 7 countries are winners in the meat market while being a loser in the fruit/ vegetable 
market. However, 33 countries are winners in the vegetable market while being a loser in the 
meat market or are not even included within the analysis of the meat market.  
Overall, in the fruit /vegetable market 60% of the countries under consideration managed to 
increase their market share, while only 31% of the countries in the meat market did so. The 
cross-tabulation nicely depicts the different structures and developments within the two 
sectors. While in the fruit/ vegetable sector the participation of developing countries and even 
LDC countries tends to increase, the development of the meat sector tends to develop in a 
completely different manner. The participation of developing countries in the market tends to 
decrease quite significantly. Furthermore, the table shows the tendency of developing 
countries of becoming specialised for and within their export market. The fact that only 7 
countries out of the sample of 67 countries are winners in both, the fruit/ vegetable and the 
meat market, underlines this impression.  
While the results of the meat cluster analysis clearly underline the a priori theoretical 
assumption of a stronger market concentration, the results of the fruit/ vegetable analysis 
rather contradict this assumption. In both analyses only some countries show a specific 
antidromic development of their export shares. In the meat sector we have the examples of 
Argentina - which is the only large scale exporter which lost a lot of its export share - or in a 
positive way: Niger and Mozambique as well as Côte d’Ivoire. Why did these countries 




very low initial quantity in the first period? The same accounts for various countries in the 
fruit/ vegetable analysis. Why did Thailand’s market share decrease so significantly whereas 
other countries such as Mexico, Chile or even Kenya and Tanzania increased their market 
share? The main question in this context, though, is: How important is the SPS capacity of a 
country for the development of export shares?  
Interpretation of the results of the gravity analysis in combination with qualitative information 
of countries’ SPS behavior aims to provide answers to the questions raised above.  
7.2 The impact of SPS measures on trade performance  
We first tested the gravity specification for our sample and for the selected markets without 
considering standards. Results are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Results of the gravity model I  









































PrefUS   ,219 
(,125) 
   
N 65  65  65  
R2 0,29  0,38  0,35  




Results of Model 1 depicted in Table 4 show that among the “standard” gravity variables 
colonial distance, population and GDP per capita are significant and coefficients carry the 
expected sign. Distance in contrary is not significant. This supports general observations 
which outline that, even in markets such as fruit / vegetables and meat, which are transport 
intensive, distance plays a decreasing role for trade flows since costs for transportation were 
relatively low.  
We tested the effects of trade preferences from both the EU and the US as the most important 
OECD markets (model 2). Although we focus on the EU market, we are able to test if exports 
are diverted to US markets because of US trade preferences. The level of preferences granted 
by the US is not significant in our models. Contrary to this, the coefficient for the level of 
trade preferences granted by the EU, however, is significant, but carries the opposite sign than 
expected. This can be explained by the fact that EU trade preferences are correlated with GDP 
per capita of countries: the lower the GDP, the higher the trade preferences. Consequently it 
does not surprise that GDP per capita turns insignificant if trade preferences are included. 
This underlines the development perspective of European trade policy. To keep complexity of 
the model low and degrees of freedom high, and to avoid multicollinearity problems, we 





Table 6: Results of the gravity model; SPS capacity variables 


























































         
SPScom   ,431 
(,213) 
*       
Tradecon_l
og 
    1,446 
(,477) 
**     
CertFarms_
log 
      ,733 
(,115) 
**   
STDFinv_ 
log 
        ,005 
(,027) 
 
           
N 65  65  65  65  65  
R2 0,30  0,34  0,38  0,58  0,29  
           
Source: own calculation 
We now included the above explained variables on SPS capacity in the gravity model. 
The first a priori hypothesis was that a higher level of border rejection indicates a lower level 
of SPS capacity for a particular product and thus leads to decreasing market shares. Hence, we 




results of the analysis it should be mentioned that - without any further knowledge of the data 
- border rejections constitute the best available indicator for SPS capacity of a country. 
However, results of the analysis show that the regression coefficient of border rejections and 
trade volume is not significant. One reason for this might be that the data availability of 
border rejections is relatively weak since a quantitative unit is not included here. Furthermore, 
we used the data at a relatively high aggregate level. Even though we distinguished border 
rejections according to the product of relevance, the level of aggregation is still relatively 
high. The assumption is that border rejections become more relevant at a different level of 
disaggregation and better data availability.  
In Model 5 and 6 we tested the “SPS activity” of countries. This variable includes the 
attendance at the WTO SPS committee and the SPS trade concerns that came up in this 
forum. Results of Model 6 show the positive coefficient of the attendance at the WTO SPS 
committee. This result underlines our preliminary assumption that countries which participate 
in the debate on standards and the standard setting process have the possibility to take the 
food quality requirements of their trading partners into account and (re)act with respect to 
them. We assume that governments participating in the WTO SPS committee regularly 
consider SPS measures as being significant and acknowledge the important role of  
governments in making the public infrastructure of a food quality and management system 
available in order to gain or increase market access. Furthermore, we assume that a regular 
participation in SPS committee meetings increases the flow of information from the European 
standard setters to their trading partners.  
Additionally, the announcement of trade concerns shows a positive result. As with the 
participation in the SPS meetings, raising trade concerns means that a particular involvement 
of the country within the SPS debate is taking place. Governments need to be aware for what 
products specific regulations of their trading partners impede their competitiveness. This is 
only possible when, in addition to the information of the trading partners, requirements as 
well as information on particular difficulties of exporters within one’s own country are 
available to the government. The second kind of information is quite rare as the institutional 
framework for downstream communication within value chains in developing countries only 
exists sporadically. Consequently, raising trade concerns indicates a better communication 
structure within the country and thus, an awareness by the government of strengths and 
weaknesses of the own food quality management system. Results of the analysis hint to the 




their market share. Population turns insignificant in this model, indicating some scale effect 
for the trade concerns: The larger the exporter, the more trade concerns are announced. 
In Model 7 we included the variable EUREPGAP. Interestingly, we found a very clear 
relation between the number of certified farms and the trade performance. The model has the 
highest coefficient of determination, even though all other gravity variables turn insignificant 
in this model. Obviously, the variable EUREPGAP is better able to explain the observed trade 
volumes rather than the standard predictors of bilateral trade flows. This can be partly 
explained by the fact that we are dealing with a sectoral model, whereas the predictors relate 
to the national economy. We conclude that the relation between certification and the fruit and 
vegetable trade is particularly strong.  
This result supports the hypothesis that SPS measures have an impact on the export ability of 
countries. Even though EUREPGAP is a private standard - certification takes place at farm 
level - it requires a public infrastructure of laboratories and laws which guarantee public 
testing, monitoring and food quality management facilities. A strong level of EUREPGAP 
certification is assumed to indicate a strong proactive involvement of the country. 
Additionally, results underline the particular importance of private standards. They hint at the 
fact that respecting SPS measures alone does not guarantee the maintenance or even the 
increase of market shares in the fruit/ vegetable market. Additional efforts in the private sector 
seem necessary.  
Finally, the impact of STDF investment on trade performance is tested in model 8. The 
variable is insignificant in the model. Keeping in mind the very uneven distribution of STDF 
as explained in section 2, this finding is not surprising. However, taking the total amount of 
money invested in various countries to strengthen developing countries’ export capacity, it 
seemed relevant to us to include this variable within the analysis. A closer look over a longer 
time period might bring more concrete results.  
8 Conclusions  
The objective of this paper was to shed more light on the question of how developing 
countries perform in a trading environment which is determined by the increasing importance 
of food safety and quality standards. The paper aimed to turn away from the traditional 
assumption of standards, implying particular barriers to trade for developing countries. It 




within a time period where the importance of standards increased significantly. Results of the 
cluster analysis show that the simple generalization of developing countries being a group of 
market share losers when taking these new developments into account is false. The closer 
look of the analysis explored the fact that developing countries are a very heterogeneous 
group. This group shows various different tendencies regarding market share development. In 
addition, the analysis illustrates that it is not appropriate to categorically title small exporters 
as losers and to generalize large exporters as winners. Especially within the fruit/ vegetable 
sector, various small and very small exporting countries managed to increase their market 
share more than the average. This sector seems to imply the potential of participating in the 
positive market development for small and large exporters alike. Nevertheless, it can be 
generalized that most of the large developing countries exporters extended their market 
shares, sometimes even quite significantly. A slightly different picture was found for the meat 
market. Only very large exporters extensively increased their market shares while many small 
and medium exporting countries lost out. However, few clusters of small and medium winner 
were found as well.  
Thereby the question remains of how important the relevance of standards is regarding the 
ability to export products and goods? Results of the gravity model give us - due to very 
limited data set - just a small impression of the big picture and, thus, have to be interpreted 
carefully. Two of the variables we developed to express a country’s SPS capacity turned out 
to be significant; the SPS activity as well as the EUREPGAP certification. All variables hint 
at the fact that a stronger involvement of the government in SPS activities as well as a better 
communication structure within the country increase SPS capacity of a country. Most 
interesting is the result of the EUREPGAP variable which underlines the importance of 
private sector involvement in food quality requirements in order to increase market shares. 
Again SPS capacity seems to be important for a successful export performance.  
Especially for the coming years - when trade preferences will, due to further trade 
liberalization in the agricultural market, play a minor role - the importance of standards and 
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Abstract 
This paper develops an analytical framework which structures the problem of whether, how 
and to what extent small producers in developing countries are disadvantaged by the 
increasing prevalence of food quality standards. Based on a literature review, the empirical 
evidence is structured and research gaps are identified. The paper finds that small and medium 
producers rarely comply without support from downstream actors. In case of well-educated 
and relatively wealthy farmers, forward integration is also found. No empirical support exists 
for the intuitively appealing hypothesis of a lower cost of compliance per unit of output for 





In the course of increasing and more differentiated demand for product quality, the nature of 
traded food products has changed from homogeneous to more heterogeneous products that 
have several quality characteristics: technical value, sensory quality, nutritional value and 
food safety, as well as the idealistic and psychological values of a product (Brockmeier, 1993, 
23; Wiegand, 1997, 43). While the technical value and sensory quality of a product can be 
assessed by the consumer, the other three quality characteristics cannot. Nutritional value and 
food safety are credence characteristics that can be assessed based on the final product by 
third parties. Most idealistic values can be classified as Potemkin attributes – characteristics 
which cannot be assessed based on the final good either by the consumer or by third parties 
(e.g. social, environmental, and animal health and welfare conditions in the production 
process) (Jahn et al. 2003; Tietzel and Weber, 1991). 
Akerlof (1970) was the first to show that markets tend to fail for quality characteristics which 
cannot be assessed by the consumer because of asymmetric information. Despite consumers’ 
willingness to pay for these characteristics, the market does not provide them since consumers 
are unable to identify or assess the particular quality of the product. To overcome this market 
inefficiency, an information flow must accompany the traditional product flow that can 
communicate each “traded” attribute of food. This is of particular importance in today’s 
highly fragmented global food markets, which are characterized by the increasing 
international separation of different parts of the value chain, such as production, processing, 
storing and transportation (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Therefore, the amount of parallel 
information requirements increases at every level of the value chain (Theuvsen, 2003). 
Providing such parallel information flows causes transaction costs which may be reduced by 
the establishment of adequate institutions. 
As a consequence, there is the tendency to move away from spot markets to higher degrees of 
vertical coordination (Pingali et al., 2005, 11; Buhr, 2003, 24; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, 111). 
As a result, management within the product chain changes, moving from management of 
individual firms that are trying to optimize their production processes towards total value 
chain management. The individual firm is thereby conceptualized as a part of the chain, 
interlinked with the production and exchange activities of other value chain participants 




One aspect of the vertical coordination process is the increasing prevalence of standards, 
which enables the heterogeneous characteristics of a product, including process and 
traceability requirements, to be marketed whenever there is a willingness to pay for these 
characteristics. The guarantee of standards requires the collection, accumulation and 
communication of information along the food production chain (Theuvsen, 2005). This makes 
quality standards, which may be public as well as private sector-driven, an ideal instrument to 
overcome market inefficiencies and to reduce transaction costs. As such, standards define the 
terms of membership of a chain and impose rules and conditions for participation. Gibbon and 
Ponte (2005, 163) underline the potential of standards to facilitate the inclusion of producers 
from developing countries in high-value chains, which are highly driven by consumers’ 
demand for quality. Standards provide retailers with the option to obtain products from 
independent producers instead of fully integrated production without any information on 
product quality. However, standards do modify the challenges producers face in the marketing 
process, and may affect different types of producers differently, depending on the nature of 
the standard as well as the capability of the producer to comply with its requirements. Hence, 
the introduction of standards potentially affects market shares, and may be accompanied by 
the marginalization and exclusion of producers. 
Besides the concern that small producers may be generally disadvantaged by institutional 
changes in the value chain (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, 143; Pingali et al., 2005, 6), it is 
frequently asserted that small producers in developing countries have more difficulties coping 
with the increasing prevalence of standards. The reasons often mentioned for this tend to fall 
into two main categories: 
1. The costs of compliance with a certain quality standard may be higher for small 
producers. This could result from the fixed cost component of complying with the 
standard, which would favour larger producers due to economies of scale (World 
Bank, 2005, 97). However, it could also be due to farm characteristics such as 
illiteracy of farmers, which makes information and documentation requirements more 
costly, or illiquidity, which may exclude farmers from the investments necessary to 
upgrade their farm to comply with the standard (Aloui and Kenny, 2005, 18; Jaffee 
and Henson, 2004, 15; Willems et al., 2005, 41). 
2. The transaction costs involved in the compliance process for other chain participants 
such as exporters may be higher in the case of smaller farms, for example owing to 
higher communication costs and monitoring compliance costs. It may therefore be 





As a result, small producers may be excluded from markets which require standards, and their 
economic situation may deteriorate (Humphrey et al., 2004, 69; Reardon et al., 2001, 12; 
Reardon et al., 2003, 29; World Bank, 2005, 3). This may especially be the case for private 
standards which include on-farm process certification, because of the sudden increase in the 
cost of compliance and the higher level of requirements with respect to information, 
communication and documentation involved in process certification. This is in contrast to 
most public product standards, which have evolved gradually over time and typically do not 
require sudden fundamental adjustments in farm management and on-farm certification. 
As an alternative to market exclusion, compliance and transaction costs could be reduced by 
ensuring a higher level of integration and coordination of farmers along the marketing chain.
17
 
In contrast to remaining a single chain segment, the participation of producers in the value 
chain may take different forms. According to Orden et al. (2004), there is a continuum of 
coordination with at one end the spot market and at the other vertical integration. Between 
these two extremes, various forms of vertical coordination can be found, such as contract 
farming, relation-based alliances, or equity-based alliances (Peterson et al., 2001). In a trading 
environment that is increasingly determined by standards, transaction and compliance costs 
could be reduced by vertical coordination, including support from a downstream actor in the 
marketing chain. Vertical coordination, however, potentially increases the dependency of 
small producers on downstream actors, which can weaken their position. 
In addition to costs, compliance with a standard may also bring benefits which may however 
be distributed unequally among farm types. Some sources mention productivity gains as a 
result of restructuring the farm when implementing the standard (World Bank, 2005, 71; 
Hatanaka et al., 2005, 362-363). If small farms are less efficient than larger ones, they may 
benefit more from such productivity gains. 
Unfortunately, however, the assessment of the effect of standards on small producers in 
developing countries only has a very thin empirical base and is largely based on plausibility 
considerations. Furthermore, no systematic overview of the factors that could determine the 
comparative disadvantage of small producers in coping with quality standards exists.  
This paper therefore has two main objectives. First, it seeks to develop an analytical 
framework that structures the problem whether, how, and to what extent small producers in 
                                                 
17 For an example of the successful integration of small developing country farmers in high-value export 




developing countries are disadvantaged by the increasing prevalence of food quality 
standards. This analytical framework is presented in Section 2 of the paper. Although it can be 
applied to compliance with food quality standards in general, certain aspects are only relevant 
for compliance with process standards, which are accompanied by third-party certification of 
agricultural producers. 
Second, the paper attempts to synthesize and structure the empirical evidence on the effects of 
quality standards on small producers in developing countries. Section 3 of the paper presents a 
literature review, which is organized according to the structure developed in Section 2. 
Finally, Section 4 draws some conclusions and identifies future research needs. 
2 Structure of the Problem 
The overall hypothesis that small producers have a comparative disadvantage in the 
compliance process is based on their specific farm characteristics and their institutional 
environment. This is depicted in the analytical framework provided in Figure 1, which is 
divided vertically into three blocks. The left side depicts farm-individual characteristics of 
small producers, characteristics of the institutional environment and characteristics of the 
standard. These affect the costs and benefits of compliance, which are depicted in the second 
block of the figure and comprise the two main determinants of the compliance process. 
Finally, the third block depicts the ways in which the costs and benefits of compliance may 
disadvantage small producers.  
To enable this problem to be examined analytically, this part of the figure is structured into 
four analytical stages. The first stage explores whether small producers comply independently 
with the standard. The second shows how small producers may comply with the standard, but 
only with the support of a downstream actor in the marketing chain. The third stage discusses 
the effect that growing dependency of small producers on downstream actors could have, and 
the fourth stage investigates whether exclusion from high-quality standard markets would be 
problematic for small producers. 
The arrow on the right-hand side of Figure 1 indicates that compliance with a standard should 
not be seen as a one-off event, but rather as a process. For those producers who initially 
complied with the standard, questions at analytical stages 1 to 4 can be posed again with 




only difference is that in case of first compliance, the necessary adjustments and costs 
involved are typically more significant.  
As long as the standard is economically relevant, those producers who do not comply with the 
standard at any point in time will continuously be confronted with the choice of whether to 
comply or not. Therefore, the questions at analytical stages 1 to 4 again apply. 
 
Figure 1: Framework for the Analysis of Disadvantages for Small Producers in Coping 
with Food Quality Standards 
 





































2.1 Individual Farm Characteristics, the Institutional Environment, and 
the Characteristics of the Standard 
Individual farm characteristics and the institutional environment are the basic determinants of 
the compliance process, and small farms tend to share particular characteristics. This supports 
the hypothesis that they are disadvantaged in terms of their compliance with standards. These 
unfavourable characteristics and their institutional environment relative to large farms are:  
 Lower technological production level 
 Less capital and land resources 
 Less human capital 
 Less ability to cope with risk 
 Less ability to exploit economies of scale 
 Less access to credits 
 Less access to information 
 Less output, urging downstream actors to cooperate with many small farms to receive 
large quantities 
In this definition, the term “small farmer” is defined in relative terms, which is the perspective 
chosen in this paper. However, small producers for markets which require standards may not 
necessarily be small (or even poor) in relation to farmers who produce for other markets, or 
subsistence producers. From a development point of view, this issue takes on special 
relevance if the relatively small producers for the market which requires the standard are poor, 
or if they face the risk of falling into poverty through a deterioration of their economic 
situation. 
In addition, the characteristics of the standard determine whether small producers in 
developing countries are disadvantaged in the compliance process. For example, standards 
which require high levels of investment and access to capital or a high degree of 
documentation and the ability to read, write and keep records may be more difficult for small 
producers to fulfill than ensuring that the maximum residue levels of pesticides are not 




2.2 Costs and Benefits of Compliance 
Figure 1 shows that the characteristics listed above potentially affect small producers’ 
competitiveness through the costs and benefits of compliance. The costs of compliance can be 
defined as “all additional costs necessarily incurred […] in meeting the requirement to comply 
with a given standard in a given […] market” (World Bank, 2005, 67). 
The costs of compliance include all costs resulting from upgrading the production process 
as well as money spent to maintain the level of compliance. Table 1 shows that the costs 
of compliance for the producer can be grouped into five main categories:  
i) costs for physical upgrading,  
ii) costs for human capital upgrading,  
iii) management costs,  
iv) the opportunity costs resulting from potentially lower yields,  
v) social costs.  
In addition, recurrent and non-recurrent cost elements can be distinguished (Bennett et 
al., 2000, 108).
18
 Recurrent costs are defined as the cost difference between the annual 
cost of production before and after compliance, once the standard has been 
implemented.
19
 Non-recurrent costs cover all upgrading costs needed to reach the quality 
level required by the standard. These are to a large extent “sunk” costs once the standard 
has been implemented. These two terms are used here in contrast to fixed and variable 
costs, since part of the recurrent costs is not related to the production quantity and 
therefore does not vary.  
Table 1 additionally distinguishes between capital and labour costs, and indicates which 
of the cost components have to be borne by the producers, and which may alternatively 
be taken on by downstream value chain participants. In practice, producers are often 
supported in implementing a standard by the buyers of the products, who bear part of the 
costs of compliance. For example, “motivation of employees” requires capital as well as 
labour input. Theoretically, the capital requirements could be fully borne by any 
                                                 
18 In addition, Bennett et al. (2000, 106) distinguish between direct and indirect costs, while the World Bank 
(2005, 69) distinguishes between tangible and intangible costs. As these concepts are a matter of 
measurement rather than a conceptual distinction, we do not use them throughout this text. 
19 This distinction is not always unanimous. In reality, most standards evolve over time. Therefore, a typical 
compliance process would involve repeated upgrading as a response to updating of the standard and thus 




downstream actor. For the labour requirements, this may also hold for the non-recurrent 
component, for example through a downstream actor organizing an initial training 
workshop. For the recurrent labour requirement, which would involve the daily 
observation and motivation of farm workers, it seems plausible that at least part of the 
labour requirement must be borne at the farm level. The distinction as to whether 
compliance costs can, partially or fully, be borne by downstream actors is not clear-cut 
and depends on the structure of the value chain. Table 1 purely depicts the theoretically 




Table 1: Costs of Compliance at Producer Level  
Categories Components Non-recurrent Recurrent  




















●  (maintenance) 
Human capital 
upgrading 
Training of employees  ● ● ● ● 
Adaptation of employee 
structure 
● ● - - 
Management Motivation of employees  ● ● ● ○ 
Own information ● ○ ● ○ 
Conceptualization ● ● - - 
Coordination with trading 
partners 
● ○ ● ○ 
Coordination with group 
members 
● ○ ● ○ 
Documentation - - ● ● 
Analyses - - ● ● 
Higher variable 
production cost 
More intermediate inputs - - ● ● 
More expensive 
intermediate inputs 
- - ● ● 
More labour - - ● ● 
Lower yields  - x 
Social costs x x 
The cost component can be assumed by a higher-level actor: ● completely; ○ partly; x not. 




Like the costs of compliance, the benefits of compliance consist of several components and 
depend on farm-individual characteristics and the institutional environment. In addition, these 
benefits depend to a large extent on the further development of the prevalence of standards. 
Producers’ benefits from compliance include: 
 less risk of being excluded from the market requiring the standard; 
 the option to sell a larger quantity on the market requiring the standard;  
 higher product prices; 
 cost reduction through optimized input use/technological change; 
 higher yields through optimized input use/technological change. 
Similar to the costs of compliance, the benefits of compliance can accrue to producers as well 
as to downstream actors. Who is able to capture which share of the benefits again depends on 
the structure of the value chain. 
2.3 Analytical Stages 
Analytical Stage 1: Does the Producer Comply Independently? 
This sub-section explores under which circumstances small producers comply independently 
from support by downstream actors, whether as individual farmers or as farmer groups. Initial 
compliance with a standard can be separated into two steps; first the decision to adopt the 
standard, and second its implementation. The former is largely determined by the producer’s 
perceived costs and benefits. A rational producer will comply whenever the perceived benefits 
are larger than the perceived costs. This situation changes once the producer starts to 
implement the standard, when compliance is increasingly determined by the real costs and 
benefits, which may differ from the ones initially perceived. Since investments in standards 
are usually in the long term, the benefits also tend to appear in the long term, and future 
market developments are important determinants of benefits. 
Small producers share common features which tend to increase their costs of compliance. As 
displayed in Table 1, additional costs may arise from the physical upgrading process for 
human capital upgrading and management, because of lower yield, and in the form of social 
costs, and are discussed below in this order. 
The capital intensity of the technical upgrading may be highly problematic for small 
producers’ initial compliance. Since small farmers usually produce capital extensively at a 




compliance tends to be higher than for larger farms. As a consequence, substantial 
investments may be required to upgrade the farm. Taking into consideration the fact that small 
producers often have less own capital and less access to credit, costs thus tend to be higher 
than for larger producers. 
Producers need access to information for human capital upgrading and management activities. 
Consequently, the introduction of standards not only requires a greater information flow from 
the producer to the buyer, but also from the buyer to the producer. Since small producers 
often have less access to modern means of communication and a lower level of market 
integration and human capital than larger producers, it is difficult for them either to generate 
this information individually or to receive it externally. Fairman and Yapp (2004), as well as 
Henson and Heasman (1998), underline how small enterprises are dependent on externally 
generated information. The need for information covers three different levels. First, the initial 
awareness of the existence of the standard and its importance for the market. Second, in the 
decision process, the producer needs detailed knowledge on the requirements of the standards. 
And third, far-reaching extension and support may be necessary in the implementation 
process, especially if human capital levels are low. Other special features of small producers 
which impede initial compliance comprise their weak capacity to cope with temporary income 
losses and the missing option to implement the standard only on part of their farm, which is 
often observed on larger farms. 
Furthermore, the independent compliance of small producers is determined by factors other 
than considerations of the economic costs and benefits. These factors may include personal 
characteristics such as risk aversion or a preference for traditional production methods, or 
they could include institutional conditions (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Walgenbach and Beck, 
2003). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pronounce the importance of institutional isomorphism, 
which is defined as the tendency of participants in a sector to form homogeneous 
organizational structures. Since sectors form a homogeneous production network consisting of 
individual producers, the decision to comply with a standard at an early stage of diffusion 
implies the decision to depart from the homogeneity of the network. Conversely, not to 
comply with a standard which is already widely diffused also involves leaving the 
homogeneity of the network. Rogers (2003) underlines that small producers acting in close 
social relations might experience high social costs in taking such a step.  
One important element of compliance with many process standards is the requirement of 




organization, and documentation require a high level of on-farm management skills, which 
are often less prevalent on small than on large farms. In order to cope with these constraints, 
the certification of farmer groups is an alternative option to certifying producers 
independently. This implies that a group of farmers establishes an internal quality 
management system which is externally audited. In this case, the producer group is the holder 
of the certificate. 
Forming producer groups may reduce costs at various levels, and has three main implications. 
First, group certification implies that not each producer is audited externally; consequently the 
costs for the external audit per producer are lower. Second, the producer organization might 
function as a source of information for producers, who accordingly do not have to generate all 
information by themselves. The group can establish direct contact with the buyer and 
consequently develop an information flow from the buyer to the producer. Third, the external 
motivation for certification is much higher if producers are organized in a group which 
includes several members who have already been certified. Having said that, the 
implementation of an internal quality management system requires considerable management 
skills and produces high costs, to the extent that it is not clear at the outset that group 
certification is generally any more favourable for small farmers than individual certification. 
Analytical Stage 2: Does the Producer Comply with Support by a Downstream Actor? 
An alternative to complying independently with a standard is the compliance of a producer 
with support by a downstream actor in the supply chain, such as an exporter enterprise. This 
implies that the downstream actor bears part of the costs of compliance. The level of support 
can have different dimensions: 
1. Low level of support: The downstream actor shoulders part of the costs of the 
information about the standard. Besides the information on the development of 
existing standards, this is of special relevance for the awareness of the existence of 
new standards. Since small producers often have limited access to information 
channels, they tend not to recognize the necessity of compliance; this is rather noted 
by the downstream actor, who is more directly aware of importers’ requirements. 
2. Medium level of support: In addition to information costs, the downstream actor also 
bears other management costs to support the producer in order to implement and 
manage the standard. This implies that the downstream actor might carry out and take 
on parts of the costs of human capital upgrading and management activities (e.g. 
developing internal audits and management plans for the compliance process, training 




the downstream actor may shoulder the certification costs and also be the holder of the 
certificate. 
3. High level of support: The downstream actor additionally carries out and bears the 
production process costs, which are relevant for compliance with a standard (e.g. 
carrying out all pesticide and fertilizer applications). 
 
Depending on the different levels of support from downstream actors, the producer faces 
different costs and benefits of compliance. These might favour a positive compliance process: 
not only do compliance costs decrease for the producer since they are partially borne by 
downstream actors, but also the risk of a misinvestment is partially assumed by the 
downstream actor. Furthermore, the producer might experience a direct benefit from 
compliance, since he or she could experience high external pressure and market exclusion in 
the case of non-compliance. 
From the perspective of the downstream actor, the phenomenon of support can be explained 
by two motives: first, small producers may become dependent on the downstream actor, 
which may be attractive from the latter’s point of view. Second, downstream actors such as 
exporting companies are interested in a stable supply of compliant products. If this supply 
cannot be satisfied by larger producers alone, who should be more able to comply 
independently with a standard, companies have to revert to smaller producers who might 
neither see the necessity of implementing a standard without external support, nor be able to 
do so. However, in the long run the incentive for downstream actors to support small 
producers in compliance with the standards in order to ensure sufficient supply may diminish 
if larger producers apply the standard. In such cases, it may be more profitable for 
downstream actors to deal with larger suppliers because of the lower transaction costs 
involved in working with a few large producers instead of many small ones. 
Although compliance of a small producer with support from a downstream actor allows the 
producer to avoid market exclusion, it does involve the risk of becoming dependent on the 
supporter. This risk increases with the level of support small producers receive. 
The question whether this dependency is potentially problematic is discussed in analytical 
stage 3. If the producer does not receive any support and consequently does not comply with 
the standard, the subsequent question is whether exclusion from the market requiring the 





Analytical Stage 3: Is the Dependency Problematic? 
The previous section introduced the risk of dependency on the part of the producer, which 
goes hand in hand with the level of support received. This dependency may be problematic 
for small producers for three reasons. First, compared to a situation of independent 
compliance, part of the value added may be transferred to downstream actors, which would 
cause the farm income of small producers to decline. 
Second, when farm work and management tasks are carried out by downstream actors, the 
producer loses knowledge about the relevant production processes, i.e. those which are 
necessary to comply with the standard, as well as those which are generally relevant for 
production. He or she relinquishes control over production and management decisions, thus 
losing sovereignty. This could result in an “unlearning” process that could in the medium and 
long term deplete the farmer’s capacity to be autonomous and independent. Of course, such 
assistance could also have the opposite effect: external involvement in production and 
management might also potentially enhance farmers’ knowledge and thus result in a learning 
process. 
Third, the downstream actor could make use of his or her strengthened market position, given 
the dependency of the producer (in an extreme case, this could be a fully monopsonistic 
position), and impose a product price that is below the competitive equilibrium. In case of 
standards which involve a certification process, the distribution of market power may hinge 
on whether the holder of the certificate is the farmer or the downstream actor. 
Analytical Stage 4: Is Market Exclusion Due to Non-compliance with Standards 
Problematic? 
It is evident that producers who fail to comply with a standard will be excluded from the 
market requiring this standard. Whether or not this is problematic depends on whether the 
possibility exists to produce for alternative markets for which compliance with the standard is 
not required; on whether production could be converted to other products; and on whether 
alternative employment opportunities exist. Alternative market access is determined by three 
different factors, as outlined below: 
Existence of public quality standards. Countries apply different levels of public quality 




Generally, high-income countries tend to have higher-level public standards than middle or 
low-income countries. Thus, producers in developing countries that are excluded from high-
standard export markets can still sell to markets requiring lower standards, which are mainly 
those of non-OECD countries or domestic markets. 
Enforcement of public quality standards. If small producers in developing countries are 
excluded from formal domestic markets because of public quality standards, they may choose 
instead to supply informal markets such as street markets and small retailers, where public 
quality standards are often not enforced (Reardon et al., 2003). 
Prevalence of private quality standards. Voluntary standards lead to a higher degree of 
market segregation. Exclusion of small producers due to non-compliance only happens in 
those market segments that require the standard. This can be problematic if private standards 
are becoming quasi-mandatory in a market, since downstream actors may increasingly insist 
on compliance as an essential marketing premise (Will, 2003). This can be observed for 
example with the EUREPGAP standard for fresh fruit and vegetable imports to the EU 
(USAID, 2005). The EU market is still in a transition period: retailers in some EU Member 
States (e.g. the UK and the Scandinavian countries) require EUREPGAP as a precondition, 
whereas many retailers in other Member States such as Germany and France prefer to buy 
EUREPGAP-compliant produce, but are also prepared to buy non-certified products when no 
EUREPGAP produce is available. From a producer perspective, this means that EUREPGAP 
constitutes a clear marketing advantage, but non-certified producers do not yet face exclusion 
from the EU market as a whole. However, although there are no direct sanctions, not 
complying with EUREPGAP means not fulfilling buyers’ preferences and, from a producer 
perspective, implies potential market exclusion in the future. 
As long as sufficient alternatives to high-standard markets exist, producers which are not able 
to comply with high standards can serve these markets. In the long run, however, private as 
well as public standards are becoming increasingly relevant, even on the domestic markets of 
developing countries (Reardon et al., 2003; 2004). The same holds for eastern European 
countries and other non-OECD importers (Csáki et al., 2004). As a consequence, shrinking 




3 Empirical Evidence 
In this section we review the empirical evidence in the literature to answer our basic research 
question as to whether standards represent a particular burden for small producers in 
developing countries.
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 This literature has expanded rapidly since the end of the 1990s, when 
the relevance of standards for international trade of agricultural and food products 
increasingly attracted the interest of researchers.  
To answer the research question, different strands of the empirical literature can be examined. 
Some analyses focus on the extent to which quality standards generally affect developing 
countries’ exports, without explicitly dealing with effects at the producer level. This strand of 
literature comprises econometric studies based on cross-sectional data. Most of the 
econometric models applied are based on the gravity equation, which typically describes a 
country's exports as a function of a variable describing the standard imposed on exports from 
this country, GDP of exporting and importing country, and the distance between both 
countries, among other factors (e.g. Otsuki et al., 2001; Jayasuriya et al., 2006). Alternatively, 
other empirical analyses apply equilibrium models to show that quality standards can have 
significant effects on developing countries’ exports (e.g. Maskus et al., [no date]; Ganslandt 
and Markusen, 2000; Peterson and Orden, 2006).  
As this paper seeks to differentiate between producer groups within countries and sectors, we 
do not review the literature on the aggregate effect of standards. Instead, we focus on the part 
of the literature that can help us address the four questions raised during the analytical stages 
in Section 2. This part mainly consists of case studies based on sectoral surveys and, to a 
lesser extent, on farm surveys as well. We concentrate on the literature dealing explicitly with 
the effects of quality standards for food products on agricultural producers, and only 
incidentally draw upon the literature on organic and environmental standards, and standards 
for the manufacturing industry.  
Some of the case studies formed part of larger research projects such as the USAID and 
Michigan State University surveys, which were conducted in Mozambique (Bawden et al., 
2001), Zambia (Giovannucci et al., 2001), Malawi (Toomey et al., 2001) and Kenya (Harris et 
al., 2001). One year later, the results of a University of London project on the impact of 
standards on exports from Mediterranean countries were published. This project emphasized 
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both the buyer’s and the producer’s perspective (Ababouch and Messaho, 2002; Yalcin et al., 
2002; Laajimi, 2002). In 2003, as the result of a World Bank research project, Wilson and 
Abiola (2003) published case studies for Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Uganda. 
Nevertheless, all these surveys concentrate on a rather general impact of standards on 
agricultural and food sectors. They do not present any farm-specific analysis, and the 
compliance process is largely neglected. However, most of the authors do assume that small 
producers tend to be more negatively affected by standards than larger farmers, but without 
providing any empirical evidence. 
This is not the case in a recent and comprehensive World Bank research project, “Food Safety 
and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries” 
(World Bank, 2005). This includes case studies that look at both the supply and the demand 
perspective. On the supply side, case studies were conducted for Kenya (Jaffee, 2003), 
Morocco (Aloui and Kenny, 2005), Senegal (Mbaye, 2005) and Thailand (Manarungsan et al., 
2005). These case studies include research at the farm level, but present little evidence on 
differentiation among producer groups. 
In addition to publications in the context of these large-scale research projects, various other 
case studies have been published over the last decade. In the following sub-section, we review 
the literature in detail according to the questions raised in the analytical stages of Section 2. 
Since empirical evidence is still scarce, we also review some papers which do not have a 
particular focus on developing countries. 
3.1 Empirical Evidence on Independent Compliance of Small Producers 
Papers with a particular focus on the compliance process, and on the question of which factors 
affect this process, are rare. Henson and Heasman (1998) develop a model of the compliance 
process with food safety standards based on empirical evidence from food manufacturers and 
retailers in the UK. As one of their major findings, they underline that the compliance process 
differs for small and large firms. They state that small firms generally implement regulations 
later and are more likely to choose partial or non-compliance. Fairman and Yapp (2004) 
modify the Henson and Heasman model to adapt it for the particular compliance process of 
small enterprises in the UK with food safety standards. They stress the complete reliance of 




driven. Walgenbach and Beck (2003) discuss the compliance process of enterprises in various 
industries with ISO 9000 in Germany, based on new institutional economics theory. One of 
their major findings is the identification of a willingness to comply even if compliance is not 
in the direct economic interest of the firm. The authors emphasize the driving force of sectoral 
isomorphism for the compliance decision, which is based on interest in cooperation and social 
acceptance. This underlines the perspective of the decision-maker, who not only focuses on 
processes within the firm, but also sees the firm as part of an institutional system. 
To the authors’ knowledge, only three surveys explicitly explore the compliance process and 
compliance strategies of producers in developing countries. Okello and Swinton (2005) 
compare the compliance process of a large and a small family farm with the EUREPGAP 
standard in a paired case study in the Kenyan bean sector. The paper is based on transaction 
cost economics, the principal agent theory and the principle of economies of scale. One of its 
major findings is the identification of different strategies on the part of both types of producer 
to respond to private standard requirements. While the larger producer chooses to become 
certified as an individual farmer, the paper identifies considerable potential for smaller 
producers to reduce the costs of compliance through group certification. The paper does not 
provide any empirical evidence of small producers being particularly disadvantaged regarding 
upgrading costs, but does produce evidence that smaller farms face higher recurrent costs.  
Chemnitz (2007) reports the results of a survey on the diffusion of the EUREPGAP standard 
in the Moroccan tomato sector, which includes a qualitative as well as a quantitative analysis. 
The paper explores the various factors that favour or impede certification based on innovation 
theory, new institutional theory, and the concept of economies of scale. Almost all Moroccan 
producers comply with the EUREPGAP standard independently from downstream actors. 
However, 22 out of the sample of 30 certified producers are vertically integrated into the 
value chain and control the processing and marketing of the raw product (whereas out of a 
sample of 33 non-certified producers, only 6 are vertically integrated). The ownership of the 
packing station may take two organizational forms, either individually or as a member of a 
cooperative. Two of the most important findings of the survey are that producers which are 
certified are in contact with their international buyers and experience external pressure from 
them, such as the threat of sourcing from other producers in case of non-compliance. The 
survey underlines the importance of vertical coordination for the compliance process of small 




compliance and farm size, suggesting that the “starting point” could well be more important 
than farm size.  
In a study based on a similar methodological approach, Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006)
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analyse the compliance process with the EUREPGAP standard in the Peruvian mango sector. 
In the sample from this sector, all EUREPGAP-certified producers are engaged in contract 
farming or enjoy a higher order of vertical coordination. Only a few large farmers are certified 
independently, and all others rely on the support of export companies. The costs of 
compliance are found to range from 0.3% to 15.2% of the production value, and average 
3.8%. This shows that the costs of compliance can impose a considerable economic burden, 
and are strikingly variable. No significant relationship between farm size and the cost of 
compliance is found. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence on Producers’ Compliance with Support from 
Downstream Actors 
Fairman and Yapp (2004, 46) show for the UK market that smaller producers are unable to 
generate knowledge about consumer requirements. Hence, their compliance is mainly 
externally driven. Various case studies discussed in this section underline this finding for 
producers in developing countries, and point to the importance of downstream actors in 
supporting small producers in the compliance process. 
In a study on how supermarkets in Central America obtain fresh fruits and vegetables, 
Berdegué et al. (2005, 265) describe a centralized procurement system under which a 
supermarket chain establishes technical assistance and training programmes to support its 
suppliers in complying with higher standards. Jaffee and Masakure (2005, 327-330) provide 
evidence from Kenya where exporters of vegetables support small suppliers by providing 
inputs, credits and extension services, advice in the application of agrochemicals, and 
supervision. Manarungsan et al. (2005, 6, 42-45) outline that with tightening vertical 
coordination, asparagus producers in Thailand are supported by exporting companies, packing 
houses or cooperatives. This support takes the form of the provision of training, extension, 
technical support and inputs. Generally, however, these studies do not go into much detail 
regarding the level, means and nature of support from higher-level actors.  
                                                 




Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) underline the particular importance of downstream actors’ 
support for the compliance process of small producers in the Peruvian mango export sector. 
One of the main findings of the study is that all small producers in the survey complying with 
the EUREPGAP standard rely upon outside support to implement the standard. This becomes 
especially visible through the observation that, despite the large differences between certified 
producers in terms of socio-economic characteristics such as farm size, education or wealth, 
all certified producers show a high level of vertical coordination, either by contracts with 
downstream actors or by vertical integration. In no case do producers who still sell to 
intermediate traders without direct contact to exporter enterprises comply with the standard. 
Additionally, the study shows that support may include the supply of inputs, extension and 
credit, as well as the assumption of farm management tasks (organization, application of 
pesticides). This reveals that the enterprises play a strong role in providing producers with 
information on the standard and directly influence their decision-making process. Thereby the 
downstream actors partially cover compliance costs by ensuring partial or complete coverage 
of cost components. 
Finally, other studies mention the importance of contract farming for compliance with private 
standards (Reardon et al., 2004, 176; Swinnen, 2005, 4, 19; Pingali et al., 2005, 21; Minten et 
al., 2006, 2, 20; Swinnen and Maertens, 2006, 17). A case study from Madagascar (Minten et 
al., 2006) describes the success story of 10,000 small vegetable producers, who have 
benefited from micro contracts combined with on-farm extension and supervision 
programmes in order to comply with the required quality. Key and Runsten (1999, 386) see 
contract farming as a possibility to overcome the information gap of small producers, and thus 
to improve their knowledge on their trading partners’ requirements. Swinnen and Maertens 
(2006, 10-13) show for various examples from Central European countries as well as from 
Mozambique, Kenya, Zambia and Latin America that farmers are increasingly engaged in 
contract farming and receive support in the form of credit, inputs, technical assistance and 
quality control.  
In summary, there are many examples of downstream actors helping small farmers to comply 
with quality standards, although no real generalizations can be made. According to Swinnen 
(2005, 47), empirical surveys show a mixed picture rather than a general exclusion of small 
producers. Similar conclusions are drawn by Berdegué et al. (2005, 265), who find that 70% 
of the suppliers for Hortifruti, a highly developed specialized retail fresh fruit and vegetable 




By contrast, several papers describe examples of small farmers losing market share as a result 
of increasing quality standards. Humphrey et al. (2004, 69-70) describe the redistribution of 
market shares as a result of quality standards in the fruit and vegetable sector in Kenya. They 
underline that “own farm production” of downstream actors increased from 40% in 1998 to 
more than 60% in 2001. All interviewees stated that they had reduced their smallholder 
supply due to concerns expressed by supermarket buyers about product characteristics and 
product quality.  
Maertens (2006, 3-5) underlines these findings for the horticultural sector in Senegal. 
Structural changes include a shift from contract farming with small-scale producers to large-
scale vertically integrated farms owned by exporting companies. Some interview partners 
stated that they had shifted from 100% reliance on contract farming to 80% reliance on 
vertically integrated production.  
There is insufficient empirical evidence to provide a clear picture on whether small producers 
are more excluded or supported when it comes to complying with quality standards. In 
addition, it would be interesting to know more about the determining factors for downstream 
actors’ choice whether to support small producers or exclude them. 
3.3 Empirical Evidence on the Dependency Effects of Supported 
Compliance 
Given that farmers are often supported by downstream actors, this section discusses whether 
this support may, beside its positive effects, have any negative effects on small producers. 
Unfortunately, few studies explicitly mention and analyse the possible dependency effects of 
supported compliance. 
In their analysis of contract farming and rural development in Latin America, Key and 
Runsten (1999, 381) outline the various problems involved in contract farming, including that 
smallholders can be extremely dependent on their contract partners. This is especially the case 
when contract farming goes hand in hand with decreasing diversification and the dependency 
on the provision of inputs, so that growers face limited exit options and lose bargaining power 
against downstream actors.  
Jaffee and Masakure (2005, 330) show that the interference of exporting companies with the 
production process on farms in Kenya’s vegetable export sector allows them to influence 




(2006), who describe how exporter enterprises in the Peruvian mango sector sometimes hold 
the EUREPGAP certificate. This might provide firms with monopsony power and allow them 
to pay producer prices below the competitive equilibrium. 
To establish the extent to which small agricultural producers face disadvantages through 
increased dependency on downstream actors, what these disadvantages look like and their 
severity, a detailed understanding of power and governance within the value chain requires 
further research. 
3.4 Empirical Evidence on How Problematic Exclusion Effects due to 
Non-compliance re 
Several papers mention the exclusionary effects of food quality standards for small 
producers.
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 This section takes a closer look at how problematic exclusion really is. For this 
purpose, we examine on which specific markets exclusion due to non-compliance plays a role, 
and which alternative markets exist. 
Various surveys suggest that the export market is divided into three different standard levels: 
Scandinavia and the UK at the top, the remaining EU countries in the middle, and non-OECD 
countries at the bottom as low-standard markets (Aloui and Kenny, 2005, 16; Jaffee, 2003, 
16). Chemnitz (2007) explores the exclusionary effects on the Moroccan tomato export 
market. Exports to high-level countries are only possible with EUREPGAP certification, and 
for the UK only with even higher standards such as “Nature’s Choice” and “From Farm to 
Fork”. Exporters to medium-standard countries have not until now faced any sanctions or 
pressure if they are not certified. However, all producers interviewed in that survey expect to 
encounter problems in marketing non-compliant products in the future.  
According to Berdegué et al. (2005) and Reardon (2005), food standards are becoming 
increasingly important for national markets in developing countries as well. This development 
is induced by the rapidly increasing importance of supermarkets in developing countries’ 
markets. Several case studies place particular focus on the restructuring of national and 
regional markets and describe this process in developing and transition countries (Reardon et 
al., 2003; 2004; Swinnen, 2005). Various authors observe a market segmentation in which 
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smaller producers are selling to less demanding but also less profitable markets (Hatanaka et 
al., 2005, 361, 366; Manarungsan et al., 2005, 1). 
In summary, exclusion effects can be observed on many markets and, owing to the globally 
increasing demand for high-standard products, alternative markets are shrinking even in 
developing countries in the long run (Moriarty et al., 2007; Traill 2006). This trend raises the 
question as to whether empirical evidence on poverty effects of market exclusion exists. 
Recent studies emphasize the diverse effects of standards on poverty (Humphrey et al. 2004; 
Minten et al., 2006; Maertens, 2006). Based on a simulation model, Humphrey et al. (2004) 
argue that a shift away from smallholder production may have a poverty-reducing impact due 
to increasing employment on large farms. Maertens supports this conclusion and provides 
empirical evidence. One of the major findings of her survey is that high-standard agricultural 
trade is “an engine of pro-poor growth” in the Senegalese French bean sector (Maertens, 
2006, 9). Increasing wage employment is found to provide income for the poorest households, 
while the reduction of contract farming concerns households which are relatively better off. 
Strengths of this study include the large sample size and the econometric consideration of a 
potential sample selection bias in isolating the effect of participation in a high value chain as 
contract farmer or as farm employee. Minten et al. (2006), on the other hand, provide 
evidence that 10,000 producers from the highlands of Madagascar have now entered the high-
quality fruit and vegetable market of the EU, creating a new niche market. Small farmers who 
participate in this market have higher incomes and more income stability. In all three surveys, 
sectors have become increasingly competitive and have increased their international market 
share because they offer high-value production. This may be particularly important in 
interpreting the results by Maertens and Swinnen (2006), Maertens (2006) and Minten et al. 
(2006), who find a poverty-reducing effect of trade which is subject to high quality standards.  
4 Conclusions and Future Research Needs 
There is widespread concern that small producers in developing countries are negatively 
affected by the increasing importance of quality standards on international as well as national 
markets. In this article, we develop a conceptual framework to analyse this concern. We 
distinguish four analytical questions: do small producers in developing countries comply with 
quality standards independently, whether as individual farmers or in farmer groups? If not, do 




do, is the resulting dependency problematic? And finally, if farmers do not comply, is their 
market exclusion problematic? 
The concept of “small farmers” as applied in this paper and in several case studies is a relative 
one. Empirical evidence shows that so-called small farmers in developing countries producing 
for export markets may be neither small compared to producers for the domestic market, nor 
small in absolute terms (e.g. Chemnitz, 2007; Kleinwechter, 2005). In addition, the properties 
which disadvantage farmers in compliance and which are often associated with “small 
farmers”, such as low production technology and efficiency as well as weak integration into 
the marketing chain, are only loosely related to physical farm size, especially when taking 
into consideration the small producers of the exporting sector.  
On a theoretical basis we show that small farmers could well have a comparative 
disadvantage in complying with quality standards owing to their specific endowments, which 
hamper their ability to acquire information on the standard and to implement it. We structure 
the non-recurrent and recurrent components of the costs of compliance involved in a standard, 
and show how the properties of small farmers may result in higher costs of compliance than 
for large farmers. In addition, from a downstream actor’s perspective, working with many 
small farmers instead of a few large ones may be less attractive owing to higher transaction 
costs. 
In contrast to the concerns resulting from theoretical and plausibility considerations, relatively 
little empirical evidence can be extracted from the literature. Few studies analyse the 
compliance process of small producers in any detail. The studies reviewed here hint that small 
and medium producers rarely comply without support from downstream actors. In the case of 
well-educated and relatively wealthy farmers, forward integration is also found, but there is 
no empirical support for the intuitively appealing hypothesis of lower cost of compliance per 
unit of output for large producers. This may be due to problems of measurement, for example 
owing to the assumption of part of the costs by downstream actors. This issue requires more 
detailed research. More empirical work is also needed with respect to the effect of group 
certification on the cost of compliance, which is considered to be a promising alternative for 
small producers in particular, but for which there is as yet no empirical data. 
Many case studies report that downstream actors such as exporters are supporting small 
farmers in the compliance process. This support can range anywhere between a low and a 




production and management. There is, however, little empirical evidence as to why 
downstream actors act in this fashion, and how this affects power and value-added 
distribution along the value chain. 
For some countries and sectors, there is some empirical evidence on the exclusion of small 
farmers from high-standard markets. Nevertheless, there is little evidence on how problematic 
such forms of exclusion are. Various alternatives could well exist, such as production for 
other markets, a shift to other products or wage employment in the high-standard production 
sector or elsewhere. Only few studies explicitly address the income effects of such 
alternatives which may also be caused by the econometric challenges resulting from a 
potential sample selection bias in comparing different groups of actors. Two of the studies 
reviewed here identify a strongly increasing level of wage employment as a result of the 
development of high-standard markets, which has a positive effect on income distribution and 
poverty. Indeed, “small” contract farmers are excluded from export markets, yet they still 
constitute a more wealthy group than those who earn their wages on larger farms. Evidence is 
still too thin to draw any general conclusions, but the facts so far certainly do not suggest that 
high standards generally cause income distribution to deteriorate or that they increase poverty.  
In light of the limited empirical evidence, there is much scope for further empirical in-depth 
case studies. Extremely interesting aspects that should be examined are the motives of 
downstream actors in supporting small farmers, and how this impacts the position of small 
farmers in the value chain. As both compliance with a standard and vertical coordination are 
dynamic processes, one promising approach would be to build an analysis using panel data 
sets capable of reflecting developments over time. From a development policy perspective, it 
is especially interesting to identify the institutional and structural requirements that allow the 
poor, irrespective of whether they are small farmers or employed on larger farms, to benefit 
from the development of high-quality standards markets.  
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The EU has notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) of 20 bilateral trade agreements 
with non-EU Member States which are currently in force (WTO, 2007). Under these 
agreements the EU grants limited preferential access to its agricultural markets for various 
countries and country groups (see Grethe (2005) for an overview). Morocco is covered by the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and has substantial preferential access to selected EU 
agricultural markets under its Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with the EU. As 
the only country in the world in this position, Morocco may export tomatoes under a 
preferential entry price to the EU. From the Moroccan perspective, tomato exports are of 
special importance due to their high share in agricultural production and trade. In 2004/2005 
tomatoes provided more than 11% of Morocco’s agricultural export value, and the sector has 
had a value share of almost 30% in total preferential exports to the EU in recent years (Grethe 
et al., 2005). From an EU perspective, Moroccan tomatoes are of special interest because they 
stand in direct competition to domestic production, especially in Spain. 
Often preferential access is granted limited by tariff rate quotas (TRQs), which result in an 
economic rent if they are filled or overfilled. If the above-TRQ tariff rate is prohibitive, the 
effects are equal to an import quota and an economic rent arises, because the marginal cost of 
supplying the imported good is below the selling price on the EU market. This mechanism 
and the potential distribution of the resulting rent have been discussed in general terms by 
various authors (Skully, 2001; Abbott, 2002; de Gorter and Kliauga, 2005), as well as more 
specifically for the countries covered by Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (Grethe et al., 
2005), based on theoretical considerations. Empirical analyses of the existence and 
distribution of such rents, however, are rare. A variation of the TRQ is the entry price quota 
(EPQ) which the EU grants to a handful of developing countries for selected fruit and 
vegetables, inter alia tomatoes from Morocco. For much of the year, EU most favoured nation 
(MFN) entry prices (i.e. for countries for which no preferential trade policies apply) for 
tomatoes prohibit exports to the EU below the entry price level. Lower preferential entry 
prices granted within an EPQ allow for limited exports to the EU. 
This paper provides empirical evidence of i) the existence of an economic rent under the EU 
preferential scheme for tomato imports from Morocco, and ii) the distribution of that rent. 




development interests, and the distribution of the resulting rents is therefore of special 
interest. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the institutional framework under which 
tomato exports from Morocco to the EU take place is described, providing first an overview 
of the EU MFN import policies for tomatoes as well as for tomato imports from Morocco, 
plus a description of the structure of the Moroccan tomato export sector. Section 3 then 
examines the EPQ from a theoretical point of view, deriving research questions and a priori 
hypotheses on the existence and distribution of an economic rent resulting from EU policies. 
Section 4 empirically examines these hypotheses, and explores different methods that could 
provide evidence of an economic rent. Finally, some light is shed on the distribution of the 
resulting rent based on interviews with various participants in the marketing chain for 
Moroccan export tomatoes. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions and discusses the 
potential future development of the quota rent. 
2 Institutional Framework for Moroccan Tomato Exports to the EU 
2.1 EU Import Market Barriers: Tariffs, Entry Prices and Preferences 
for Morocco 
The EU applies two different MFN import policies for tomatoes: ad valorem tariffs and the 
entry price system. The ad valorem tariff is at a relatively low level and varies seasonally 
between 8.8 and 14.4%. 
The entry price system is applied by the EU for many fruits and vegetables that are considered 
particularly sensitive, and effectively establishes minimum import prices. If the CIF import 
price of a shipment is below the entry price, the entry price system provides an opportunity to 
invoke gradually specific tariffs, in addition to ad valorem ones. If the imported good comes 
in at an import price not more than 8% below the entry price, the additional tariff will equal 
the difference between the import price and entry price. If the import price is more than 8% 
below the entry price, the full WTO-bound specific tariff, which is much higher than the ad 
valorem tariff, will be charged. This “eight percent rule” is a prohibitive import barrier for 
most imports below 92% of the entry price, because of the high level of the maximum specific 




tariffs which the EU applies to MFN imports of tomatoes as well as to preferential imports 
from Morocco. 
Table 1: MFN and Preferential EU Tariffs and Entry Prices (2004/2005) 






















 10,000 14.4 0.0 14.4 626 461 73.6 298 47.6 
Nov.
a
 26,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 626 461 73.6 298 47.6 
Dec.
a
 30,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 626 461 73.6 298 47.6 
Jan.
a
 30,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 846 461 54.5 298 35.2 
Feb.
a
 30,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 846 461 54.5 298 35.2 
Mar.
a
 30,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 846 461 54.5 298 35.2 
April
a
 15,000 8.8 0.0 8.8 1126 461 40.9 298 26.5 
May
a
 4,000 14.4 0.0 14.4 726 461 63.5 298 41.0 
June - 14.4 - 5.76 526 -  298 56.7 
July - 14.4 - 5.76 526 -  298 56.7 
Aug. - 14.4 - 5.76 526 -  298 56.7 
Sept. - 14.4 - 5.76 526 -  298 56.7 
a Plus a conditional quota of 25,000 tons which may be used up to the amount of 30% each month, from 
November to May (for further details, see below). 
Sources: European Union (various issues): OJ L345/121, 31.12.2003; OJ C103A, 30.04.2003; European 
Commission (2007a), own calculations. 
Table 1 shows that MFN ad valorem tariffs are highest from May to October, while MFN 
entry prices are low compared to other periods during this time. This seems somewhat odd, as 
low entry prices in the summer months obviously reflect low EU prices during the main EU 
production season, and third-country exporters have no comparative price advantage in this 
period. Consequently there is no need to protect national producers by high entry prices. 
Nonetheless and somewhat inconsistently, the ad valorem tariff is highest during that season. 
MFN entry prices are highest in the winter months, peaking in April. This reflects the 
objective of protecting EU producers of winter tomatoes from other countries that adjoin the 
Mediterranean Sea and which have a comparative advantage and could therefore depress EU 
tomato prices. The country with the greatest interest in high prices during wintertime is Spain, 




allocated in the regions of Almeria, Murcia, Alicante and the Canary Islands, where temperate 
climates allow the production of greenhouse tomatoes from October to May. In the region of 
Almeria and on the Canary Islands, the production season overlaps almost exactly with the 
production season of export tomatoes from Morocco. 
Table 1 also shows that the maximum specific tariffs for tomatoes are much higher than the 
ad valorem tariffs, and sum up to 26.5 to 56.7% of the entry price. The entry price system 
therefore provides a strong incentive not to undercut the entry price level.  
Additionally, Table 1 indicates the preferential treatment of tomato exports from Morocco to 
the EU in the marketing year 2004/2005. The relevant Protocol (OJ L345/121, 31.12.2003) 
establishes an EPQ of 190,000 tons for tomatoes originating in Morocco to be eligible for 
import at a preferential entry price of €461/t. This quantity can be imported without any ad 
valorem duty from October to May. Therefore, the EPQs are at the same time TRQs because, 
in addition to reduced entry prices, the ad valorem duty rate is also reduced (to zero). For 
simplicity, the respective quantities are designated throughout the text as EPQs, as the entry 
price reduction is the effect which dominates the reduction of the ad valorem tariff. From 
June to September (the main production season in the EU) the MFN entry price applies and 
the MFN ad valorem tariff rate is reduced by 60%.  
The total quota (which can be exceeded by 1%) applies to a given marketing year, which is 
specified in the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (OJ L70/02, 18.03.2000) as running from 
1 October to 30 September. The quota is divided into monthly quantities. The marketing year 
starts in October with an EPQ of 10,000 tons. The period with the largest quotas is from 
December to March, with 30,000 tons in each month. If imports from Morocco undercut the 
relevant entry price level, the EU entry price system mechanisms described above come into 
force. The EPQs under the preferential price system, as well as TRQs for fruits and vegetables 
in general, are administered by the EU on a “first-come, first-served” basis: the import 
quantity is controlled at the border, and if the EPQ is exceeded, above-quota policies apply for 
the rest of the month. While Morocco guaranteed that it would not exceed the given annual 
quantity under a voluntary self-restraint (VSR) as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
in the past (OJ L 305/20, 21.11.2001, Article 2; see also Council Regulation 2264/2001), it 
now has the opportunity to exceed the annual quantity of the EPQ by exports under MFN 
conditions (OJ 345/121, 31.12.2003). An incentive for Morocco not to exceed the annual EPQ 
is an additional quota which applies to the following marketing year should the basic quantity 




additional quota for the following year is notably lower than when the conditions are 
complied with. Since the marketing year 2003/2004, the additional quota started at 15,000 
tons, and the quantity is augmented by 10,000 tons each year when the EPQ is complied with. 
If, however, Morocco exceeds the EPQ in any marketing year, the additional quota diminishes 
by 20,000 tons beginning in 2004/2005. The additional quota applies from 1 November to 30 
May, but Morocco is not allowed to use more than 30% of the additional quota during any 
month. 
The status of EU preferences for Morocco presented above depicts the current situation. The 
origin of trade preferences for Morocco dates back to its close relationship with France and 
has its roots in colonial history. Upon independence in 1956, the Moroccan vegetable market 
was largely integrated into the French market (Aloui, no year). Preferential access conditions 
have been regulated since then by France and later by the EU. Preferential agreements for 
tomato exports from Morocco have been revised several times. One large step was the 
negotiation of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into 
force in 2000. Under the initial Agreement, Morocco received a preferential EPQ of 150,676 
tons from October to March (OJ L70/02, 18.03.2000). Since then the preferential import 
quantity and the import period have been revised almost every year.  
2.2 Structure of the Moroccan Tomato Export Sector 
The agricultural sector in Morocco plays an important economic and social role. As shown in 
Table 2, the share of agriculture in total GDP has varied in recent years between 15 and 17%, 
mainly depending on rainfall in the production season. The value of total agricultural 
production was about €5.7 billion on average in 2004 and 2005 (own calculations; World 
Bank, 2007). Aside from the high economic importance of the sector, its social importance 
results from its high share in employment of the rural population. About 80% of the working 
rural population is employed in the agricultural sector, of which 22% in the horticultural 




Table 2: Production and Exports of Tomatoes Compared to the Size of the Agricultural 
Sector and the Economy as a Whole 
  1994/1995 2004/2005 
(1) Share of agriculture in GDP (%) 16.6 15 
(2) Value of agricultural production (mill. €) 4,030.0 5,711.0 





(4) Quantity of tomato production (1,000 t) 737.0 1,209.0 
(5) Quantity of greenhouse tomato production (1,000 t) 320.0 535.0 
(6) Value of total exports (mill. €) 3,405.0 8,060.0 
(7) Value of agricultural exports (mill. €) 527.0 909.0 
(8) Value of horticultural exports (mill. €)  157.0
b
 223.0 
(9) Value of tomato exports (mill. €) 48.0 91.0 
(10) In % of total exports 1.4 1.3 
(11) In % of agricultural exports 9.1 10.1 
(14) In % of horticultural exports  30.1 41.2 
(15) Quantity of Moroccan tomato exports (1,000 t)
c
 168.0 175.0 
(14) Of which to the EU (%) 87.8 90.6 
(17) Of which to Central and Eastern Europe (%) 4.1 4.4 
(18) Of which to Switzerland (%) 2.9 4.9
 
(19) Of which to other destinations (%) 5.2 0.1 
a Own calculations based on Eurostat data for the years 1995/1996 and 2004/2005, b1998, caverage marketing 
years 1993/1994-1994/1995 and 2003/2004-2004/2005. 
Sources: World Bank (2005a) for GDP and total production value, EACCE (2007) for destination of exports, 
FAO (2007) for quantity of tomato production, APEFEL (2005) for production of greenhouse tomatoes, 
Office des Echanges for value of horticulture products exports, Eurostat (various issues) for IUV, own 
calculations. 
Aside from livestock breeding and wheat production, the most important segment of the 
agricultural sector is horticulture, within which tomato production plays the most important 
role. The production value of greenhouse tomatoes averaged €114 million in 1994/1995 and 
increased to almost €240 million in 2004/2005. The total produced quantity of greenhouse 
tomatoes has also increased in recent years, rising from less than 200,000 tons in 1992/1993 




Agricultural goods play an important role in the Moroccan export sector. In 2004/2005, total 
exports had an annual value of more than €8 billion, while the share of agricultural products 
stood at 11%. Tomatoes rank fourth on the Moroccan export list of agricultural goods, with an 
annual export value of €91 million in 2004/2005 (immediately behind mandarins, oranges and 
olives). The export value of tomatoes is about 10% of the total agricultural export value, and 
in 2004/2005 the export of tomatoes covered more than 40% of the export value of 
horticultural products, which account for €223 million or 25% of agricultural exports. 
In the marketing years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, Morocco exported about 91% of its total 
tomato exports to the EU (EACCE, 2007). Within the EU, more than 79% of these tomatoes 
were delivered to France, followed by Spain (4%) and Italy (1.7%) (own calculations; 
EACCE, 2007). Other important export destinations for Moroccan tomatoes are central and 
eastern European countries, which accounted for 4.4% of total Moroccan tomato exports, and 
Switzerland (4.9%). 
Even though Morocco has a long history of vegetable exports, the sector underwent a 
significant change in 1986 when the national export monopoly was liberalised. Since then, 
many producers have started production and the total area of greenhouse tomatoes in Morocco 
has increased, reaching 3,920 ha by 2004/2005 (see Table 3). About 90% of the area is 
located in the southern Atlantic coastal strip in the region of Souss Massa, in which 93% of 
total production originates (APEFEL, 2005). The high level of concentration in this region is 
related to the availability of relatively cheap land and favourable weather conditions for the 
production of early tomatoes. 
The Moroccan agricultural sector comprises about 1.5 million farms (WTO, 2003), of which 
about 8,000 produce early vegetables and only 400 produce export tomatoes. As shown in 
Table 3, around 30% of tomato producers are small-scale farmers who cultivate less than 5 ha. 
Their production area represents only about 5-10% of the total production area for early 
tomatoes. The majority of producers cultivate an area between 5-20 ha. Farms in this group 
cultivate around 50% of the total tomato area. Only 10-15% of all farms are larger than 20 ha, 




Table 3: Structure of the Moroccan Export Tomato Sector 
(1) Number of total export vegetable producers 8,000 
(2) Number of total export tomato producers  400 
(3) Area of vegetable production in greenhouses  30,000 ha 
(4) Area of export tomato production in greenhouses  3,920 ha 
(5) Farm size % area % farms 
(6) Farm size from 0-5 ha 5-10 30-35 
(7) Farm size from 5-20 ha 45-55 50-55 
(8) Farm size larger than 20 ha 35-40 10-15 
(9) Number of farmer cooperatives producing tomatoes Ca. 40 
(10) Number of export groups exporting tomatoes Ca. 12-15 
(11) Share of the three largest export groups in total exports 70% 
Sources:APEFEL (2007) for the number of total export vegetable producers and the area of vegetable 
production in greenhouses; APEFEL (2005) for the area of tomato production in greenhouses; own 
interviews in 2005 for farm size, number of tomato producers, cooperatives, and export groups; and own 
calculations. 
The production and marketing chain can be subdivided into three major levels: the production 
or farm level, the processing level and the exporting level. As depicted in Figure 1, the 
structure of the Moroccan export sector is highly integrated. The largest part of production, 
between 40 and 55%, is produced in completely integrated export structures. The integrated 
exporters take two different organisational forms. The first type is dominated by tomato 
producers of various sizes which are organised in farmer cooperatives at the packing stations 
level. Most cooperatives own, depending on their size, one or more packing stations, which 
provide technical services for packing and wrapping before the tomatoes are exported. 
Different cooperatives unite to form export groups. Producers join cooperatives and export 
groups to reach a higher organisational level and consequently improve their negotiating 
position in the marketing chain. The packing stations, cooperatives and export groups play an 
important intermediate role in the marketing chain between producers and different players in 
the export process. The packing stations are the most important source of information for 
producers and, if set up as cooperatives, organise the marketing process for their members. 
The task of these export groups is to organise all the logistics, such as transportation, the 
purchase of production inputs and the negotiations with banks and other actors in the sector. 
The second type of integrated exporters is enterprises that cover all levels of the production 
and marketing chain, and only process and export products from their own farms. 
The second important organisational form within the sector is that of semi-integrated 




of their farms are processed. Additionally, these enterprises process and sell tomatoes of other 
producers on a commission basis. 35 to 40% of total early tomatoes are sold by semi-
integrated exporters, and 70% of the total exported tomatoes can be traced back to just three 
export groups, of which two are integrated and one has a semi-integrated structure. 
Figure 1: The Structure of the Moroccan Tomato Export Sector 
Source: Own expert interviews. 
The last and least important organisational form is that of non-integrated exporters, which 
account for less than 10% of all exported early tomatoes. These exporters take tomatoes from 
cooperatives or from individual farmers on a commission basis. According to several 
statements by interviewees, the importance of this organisational form is likely to decrease 
still further in the near future.  
The overall organisation of the export market of fruits and vegetables in Morocco is 
controlled by the EACCE (Etablissement Autonome de Contrôle et de Coordination des 
Exportations; the Public Export Control and Coordination Authority), which was founded in 
1986 when the national export monopoly was liberalised. The EACCE controls and ensures 
compliance of Moroccan products with international and bilateral regulations in terms of 
quantity as well as quality. Furthermore, it functions as an important source of information for 














































3 A Priori Hypotheses 
The first a priori hypothesis is that the EPQ is binding. Otherwise Morocco would not have 
put so much effort into repeatedly negotiating increments (see above). Second, if the EPQ is 
binding, a rent results: the marginal cost of supplying Moroccan tomatoes to the EU is below 
their selling price in the EU. Again, this is supported by the sustained efforts of Morocco to 
increase the EPQ. But no a priori assumptions exist on the size of the quota rent, which we 
try to quantify in this paper. Figure 1 depicts a potential quota rent. 
Graph 1: Potential Rent Resulting from an EPQ 
Source: own illustration 
 
Graph 1 shows a scenario in which the EU MFN entry price level (EPMFN) is set above the 
level of domestic price equilibrium (PEU Dom), which matches the EU import demand curve 
ID0, so that no imports occur at MFN conditions. A reduced entry price (EPPREF) which is 
























equilibrium, but above the price level which would occur with completely liberalised trade 
(PLIB). With the export supply curve of the preferential supplier at ESLIB, and without any 
further restriction, the domestic price level in the EU would thus be EPPREF and the imported 
quantity would be QEP. But an EPQ is set at QEPQ such that the resulting EU price is PEPQ. In 
this scenario, the quota rent is the price difference between the export supply curve at QEPQ 
and EPPREF multiplied by QEPQ.  
The resulting export supply curve of the preferential supplier (ESEPQ), which includes the 
effects of policies, starts at EPPREF and takes a horizontal course up to QEPQ, from where on it 
runs vertically until the level of the MFN entry price plus the MFN tariff. This is the price 
level at which an unlimited quantity would be allowed to enter the EU market: the export 
supply curve thus runs horizontally until it meets the export supply curve without the effect of 
the entry price system but including the tariff (EST), from where on it joins EST.  
Unlike the domestic market constellations reflected in ID0, which result in an exact fill of the 
EPQ, alternative domestic supply and demand constellations as reflected in import demand 
curves ID1 and ID2 are possible. ID1 shows a higher import demand, which results in imports 
at MFN conditions exceeding the EPQ level and a domestic EU price at EPMFN + T. ID2 
reflects a lower import demand with the domestic EU price at the EPPREF and an EPQ 
underfill. In both situations the rents resulting from the import system, which are not depicted 
in Figure 1, can be calculated as the vertical distance between ESLIB and the respective price 
level multiplied by the respective export quantity. 
A third hypothesis based on the institutional framework described above is that a large part of 
the rent accrues to the Moroccan part of the marketing chain. This is because the “first-come, 
first-served” system of license distribution does not give EU importers any negotiating power, 
in contrast to the “license on demand” system, which the EU applies to most other products 
under which licenses are only distributed to EU importers. This leaves the question as to 
which participants in the Moroccan marketing chain receive the rent. Without any additional 
knowledge, two alternative a priori hypotheses are formulated: 
1. The rent is dissipated in rent-seeking activities. Principally, the first-come, first-served 
system provides an incentive to export early for trading companies, in order to 
increase their share in the quota (Skully, 2001). If there is no coordination, then the 
rent can be expected to end up, for the most part, in the pockets of the owners of those 




As the EPQ is fixed for monthly periods, this could, for example, primarily benefit the 
owners of transportation capacity at the beginning of the month. In an extreme 
scenario, the efforts of producers and traders to be early could lead to marginal costs 
increasing to the extent that the initial quota rent fully dissipates.  
2. The Moroccan export sector acts like a cartel. As the tomato-exporting sector in 
Morocco is relatively concentrated and well organised (see above), an alternative 
option could be a cartel-like division of EPQ shares among traders as well as 
producers. Such a coordinated process could be based on many factors, including 
historical market shares, readiness to pay to the coordinating unit, and so on. 
4 Results 
4.1 Is the EPQ Binding? 
To determine whether the EPQ is binding, it was first necessary to establish whether the entry 
price reduction allows tomato exports from Morocco to enter the EU. To this end, Graph 2 
displays weekly MFN entry prices, preferential entry prices, Moroccan Standard Import 
Values (SIVs) as reported by the European Commission as indicators for the Moroccan 
import price, and Spanish wholesale prices (WP) for the period 2000-2005. 
The MFN entry price plus the ad valorem tariff for tomatoes is higher in winter than in 
summer and reaches its peak in April. Furthermore, Graph 2 shows that the preferential entry 
price for Morocco in the winter months is considerably lower than the MFN entry price. The 
SIV of Moroccan tomatoes, which is the average of observed wholesale market prices for 
Moroccan tomatoes in the EU minus a marketing and transportation margin, is between the 
MFN and the reduced entry price in 55% of all observations. In such a situation it is the 
reduced entry price which allows for importation. In about 21% of all cases, however, 
Moroccan SIVs are below the preferential Moroccan EP. In such cases, additional duty must 
be paid or importation must take place according to alternative procedures. These procedures 
require the proof that the final selling price on the EU market of the shipment concerned is 
above the EP level (for details, see Goetz and Grethe, 2007). In 25% of observations, SIVs are 
above even the MFN entry price level. In those cases, the preferential entry price is not 
relevant to Morocco, as even the MFN entry price is not restricting. This occurs in situations 
in which the EU price level for tomatoes, which is indicated by the Spanish average wholesale 





Graph 2: Weekly Entry Prices, Moroccan SIVs and Spanish Wholesale Prices for 
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Sources: European Commission (2007a, b, c), own calculations. 
Thus it can be said that indeed for large parts of the high season of Moroccan tomato exports 
to the EU, it is the preferential price which allows for imports from Morocco. To check the 
extent to which Morocco makes use of the EPQs, Graph 3 depicts monthly EU import 



























































































Sources: Eurostat (various issues), OJ L70/02, OJ L305/20, OJ L345/121, own calculations. 
Graph 3 shows that, on average, EPQs are binding. While in some months Morocco does not 
completely fill the EPQs, in other months they are exceeded. The graph shows that, for 
example, from 2000 to 2002 the quota was not fully used in December, whereas it was 
exceeded in March and April from 2001 until 2003. In part, these irregularities result from the 
fact that Morocco can reallocate monthly EPQs up to 20% between months (see above). In 
some years Morocco did exceed its total annual quota. In 2001/2002, the total imported 
quantity was 172,858 tons and consequently exceeded the total limit of 168,757 tons of the 
EPQ by 4,101 tons, even though Morocco had guaranteed that total imports in a marketing 
year would not exceed the EPQ.  
The graph also depicts that in all marketing years from 2000/2001 to 2002/2003, in the first 
period of the marketing year (October to February) total imports did not exceed the limit of 
the given EPQ. Consequently, the conditional contingency came into force which was then 
surpassed in all years. This is because the additional EPQs for April and May were granted 
only if total imports from Morocco did not exceed the given limit of the EPQ in the first 
period of the marketing year. This mechanism leads to the observation that the EPQ was only 
respected in the first part of the marketing year, and not adhered to in the second part of the 
year after the additional quota became relevant. Exceeding the quota had no negative effects 
for the next marketing campaign, and consequently there was no incentive not to exceed the 
EPQ subsequently. As an example, in the marketing year 2001/2002, the total basic EPQ of 




From the marketing year 2003/2004 onwards, the rules were changed as described above and 
the total quota was not exceeded. In the following marketing year 2004/2005 Morocco 
surpassed its total given quota by 6.4%. As a consequence, the additional quota of the 
marketing year 2005/2006 was reduced by 20,000 tons. Hence, Morocco had an additional 
quota of only 15,000 tons rather than 35,000 tons.  
The relevance of the additional EPQ for the Moroccan export sector between May and April 
becomes more apparent when the price situation in the EU during this portion of the year is 
examined closely. Graph 2 depicts a strong correlation between the Spanish wholesale price 
(which indicates the EU price level) and the Moroccan SIV. In all five years (2000-2005), 
from March to May, Spanish wholesale prices as well as Moroccan SIVs are low. This price 
drop is related to the beginning of the open-field tomato production season in the 
Mediterranean part of the EU. Due to the low price level in the EU, Morocco as a extra-EU 
country is no longer able to sell its tomatoes on the EU market at MFN entry price level. 
Consequently, Moroccan tomato exports highly depend on the preferential entry price during 
this time of the year. As a result, the additional EPQ is of special interest for Morocco and 
provides a strong incentive to respect the EPQ during the rest of the marketing year.  
4.2 Does a Rent Exist? 
There are three different ways of determining a potential rent. First, one can check whether 
the selling price on the EU market (minus the differential marketing cost) is above the selling 
price on the domestic Moroccan market. Second, one can compare the marginal cost of selling 
to the EU market to the selling price on the EU market, as lower marginal production costs 
would indicate the existence of a rent. And third, one can compare selling prices to prices in 
other countries in which imports are not subject to quantitative restrictions. Unfortunately, the 
first option is not feasible because the quality that is comparable to that exported to the EU is 
usually not sold on the domestic market. The remaining two options and the respective results 
are described in detail below. 
4.3 Comparing Production Cost to Selling Price 
The determination of the marginal production cost is based on the assumption that the 
marginal cost at sector level equals the average cost, and that the marginal cost can thus be 
measured as the average cost of an efficient producer. This assumes that the expansion of 




labour, which seems realistic in the current situation in which the area available and labour 
are abundant, and water is not priced according to its social cost (see below). 
The survey of production costs revealed that this topic appears to be a very sensitive issue for 
Moroccan interviewees. Recently Morocco has participated in new negotiations for a possible 
extension of EPQs. Given that Morocco is the most important competitor of Spanish 
greenhouse production, it is more opportune, from a Moroccan perspective, to claim high 
production costs. As only very few surveys about production costs are available and are 
moreover relatively old, the determination of production costs is mainly based on interviews 
with various exporters and other experts in the sector. Table 4 provides an overview of the 
different cost components of the Moroccan export tomato sector. 
Table 4: Production and Exportation Cost of Tomatoes 
On farm production cost €/kg tomatoes 
Sources:  
APEFEL survey 1997 0.18 
Average reported by exporters
a
  0.18 
Range reported by exporters 0.15-0.22 
Applied in further calculations 0.18 
Corrected production cost 0.23 
Exportation cost  
Processing cost 0.15 
Transport cost  0.18 
Total cost in Perpignan 0.56 
a Interviews with five exporters in 2005. 
Sources: APEFEL (1997), own interviews with exporters, own calculations. 
The first rows of Table 4 depict the production cost in Morocco without any further 
processing or transport cost. According to different sources, the production cost lies between 
€0.15 and €0.22/kg. To this must be added an additional amount because not all greenhouse 
tomatoes produced for export are in fact exported on quality grounds, with part of the total 
production sold on the national market at prices below production cost. The loss thus depends 
on two variables: the share of production which has to be marketed on the domestic market, 
and the difference between the domestic price and production cost. Information on these 
variables varies from one source to the next. One survey (APEFEL, 1997) has estimated this 
share at 50% and the domestic selling price at €0.10/kg, yet own calculations based on 




and export data from the EACCE suggest that the share which must be marketed domestically 
is around 60% with a selling price of around €0.14/kg. Interview partners consistently 
reported that around 40% is sold on the domestic market at an average price level of €0.10/kg. 
The production cost of export tomatoes is corrected for losses based on the assumption that 
40% of production is sold on the domestic market at a price of €0.10/kg. Therefore the 
corrected production costs are estimated at €0.23/kg. 
Adding the processing and the transport cost to Perpignan, the most important export 
destination, costs mount to €0.56/kg. The average export price to the EU from 2000 and 2005 
was €0.76/kg (import unit values calculated based on Eurostat (various issues) are taken as an 
indicator of the export price). Thus, the resulting rent amounts to €0.20/kg. Based on an 
average annual export quantity to the EU of about 185,000 tons per year during that period, 
the resulting rent is estimated at €37 million per year. 
4.4 Comparing Morocco's Export Price on the EU Market to that on 
Other Markets 
The second possibility of determining the existence and size of a rent is to compare the selling 
price to the EU with the selling price to other countries. Even though most tomatoes are 
exported to the EU and exports to many other countries cannot be compared for quality 
reasons (for example those to central and eastern European countries), between 4,000 and 
14,000 tons of tomatoes are exported to Switzerland annually, free of any tariff and without 
any quantitative restriction. Therefore, Graph 4 compares Swiss and EU import unit values 
(IUVs) for Moroccan tomatoes for the period 2000-2005. 
For the period 2000-2005, during the EU preference period, the IUV for tomatoes from 
Morocco in Switzerland, corrected for about €0.05/kg higher transportation costs than to 
Perpignan, was about 15% lower than to the EU. If the selling price to Switzerland is not due 
to existing trade distortions, and is assumed to be the equilibrium price, the results suggest a 
rent of about €0.12/kg for exported tomatoes to the EU. This is about 60% of the rent 




Graph 4: Swiss and EU Import Unit Values for Moroccan Tomatoes, 2000-2005 
Sources: Swiss Federal Customs Administration (2007), Eurostat (various issues), own calculations. 
 
5 Who Gets the Rent? 
The first question in the context of distribution of the rent is how the rent is shared between 
the Moroccan export and the EU import sides. The EU administers the EPQ according to the 
“first-come first-serve” principle. Furthermore, exports are coordinated among Moroccan 
exporters by the EACCE so that the EPQ quantity is exactly met. As Morocco has an interest 
in not exceeding the given EPQ in order not to lose the additional quota of 20,000 tons of 
tomatoes, exports are strictly organised. In the beginning of each month, exports to the EU are 
not limited and each export group may export as much as it wants. Exported quantities are 
however monitored by the EACCE. If, after 10-15 days, the export trend hints at a potential 
excess over the given monthly EPQ, the EACCE convenes an export committee comprising 
representatives from all export groups, from the Ministry of Agriculture, from the EACCE 
and the two most important producer organisations. In this committee, all export groups must 
reach a consensus on the distribution of the remaining quantity. Generally, the quantity is 





































































































the month. The precise period is subject to discussion. As an incentive to export more to 
destinations other than the EU, the total exported amount is taken into account, not just the 
quantity exported to the EU. According to different exporters, shares in the remaining 
quantity stay relatively constant among export groups. Once the committee agrees on the 
distribution, the EACCE enforces compliance. Only exporters which are certified by the 
EACCE may export tomatoes, and certification must be renewed annually. The yearly 
renewal of the export certificate functions as a possible sanction against non-compliant 
exporters. 
The Moroccan side thus acts rather like a cartel and consequently European companies have 
little negotiating power. Furthermore, all members of an export group are informed about the 
prices the different commissioners have obtained on the export market, and the resulting 
transparency adds to the negotiation power of Moroccan exporters. All this supports the 
assumption that much of the rent ends up on the Moroccan rather than on the EU side. 
A second question is to what extent part of the rent is dissipated in rent-seeking activities or 
because of the involvement of extra-marginal suppliers. Given that tomatoes are traded when 
they are as fresh as possible, an “export run” at the beginning of each month is unlikely. Even 
though it would make sense for producers to export early in the month to obtain a large part of 
the rent, exporters try to plan a constant production period in order to meet the marketing 
needs of their clients, and ensuring that export tomatoes are as fresh as possible. 
In addition, the allocation of the quota to the export groups needs to be arranged by 
consensus, which leaves little space for swaying any decision-making authority. As Figure 1 
shows, below the level of the export committee, quantities are rationed at various levels in the 
marketing chain: by exporters among farmers and farmer cooperatives, and by farmer 
cooperatives among their members. At every level where quality allocation takes place, rent-
seeking would be possible. However, as the graph shows, due to the highly concentrated 
organisational structure of the sector, 64-95% of all quantity allocation takes place within 
integrated or semi-integrated structures. Within cooperative export groups, the same 
allocation rule as in the export committee is usually applied. All producers are allowed to 
export as much as possible at the beginning of the month, and only if the committee limits 
exports do the export group and individual cooperatives distribute the remaining quantity 
based on the same past reference period as chosen by the export committee. This again leaves 
little possibility to sway any decision on quantity allocation. The fact that the export 




lead to part of the rent dissipating in exports which earn less than their marginal cost, but 
contribute to a higher share in the EU EPQ. 
Even though there are rarely any physical rent-seeking activities, part of the rent does 
dissipate in the high organisational efforts of the sector, including the work of the export 
committee. The export groups, as well as the cooperatives, are financed by a margin of the 
selling price. Unless one is a member of an export group, it is scarcely possible to participate 
in the export sector. 
As the sector is organised quite competitively, it seems very unlikely that a large part of the 
rent dissipates because of the existence of extra-marginal suppliers. According to various 
interview partners, there are only a few differences in production efficiency, whereas there are 
larger differences in marketing. Indeed, this leads exports to accumulate with a handful of the 
most efficient export groups. What is surprising, however, is that in spite of the significant 
rent, new producers and exporters rarely emerge. The mechanisms which explain the limited 
appearance of new enterprises in this sector are not completely clear, although one large 
obstacle for newcomers is the strict water policy in the region of Souss Massa, which does not 
allow the establishment of new farms in the region. 
A third question is how the existing rent is distributed within Morocco. Due to the high degree 
of education (and thus knowledge about prices which can be realised on the EU market), it 
seems realistic that farmers should be able to obtain a large part of the rent. Depending on 
their degree of satisfaction with the price received, they may also choose to join an alternative 
cooperative or export as a group, something which happens quite often, and prevents 
intermediates from capturing a large part of the rent. 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 Size and Distribution of the Quota Rent 
The indicators used in this study suggest a quota rent of €0.12 to 0.20/kg of tomatoes. Based 
on 2000/2005 export quantities, this results in a total rent of €22-37 million per year, or 16-
24% of the export value of tomatoes to the EU during the preferential period. Compared with 
the total agricultural preference margin (without tomatoes) of about €50 million for Morocco 
under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, this is a significant amount (Grethe et al., 2005). 




method of allocating import licences, it is likely that a large part of the quota rent ends up on 
the Moroccan side. The export groups publish prices obtained on the EU market among their 
member cooperatives to create greater competition among importers and consequently 
improve the negotiating power of Moroccan exporters. The structure of the sector also 
suggests that rent dissipation is limited and that a significant part of the rent ends up in the 
hands of agricultural producers. 
7 Future of the Quota Rent 
The future of the quota rent greatly depends on the further development of the EU MFN 
barriers to its tomato markets. Obviously, there is little domestic incentive to reform the entry 
price system: even though the EU substantially reformed the common market organisation 
(CMO) for fruits and vegetables in 2007, the entry price system stayed untouched. However, 
the latter may be affected by the potential conclusion of international trade negotiations in the 
WTO. It is expected that negotiations on market access in the current Doha round will result 
in a further reduction of MFN tariffs and entry prices and could thus erode the quota rent 
(Goetz and Grethe, 2007). 
In addition, the rent could be eroded by increasing production costs caused by higher product 
or processing standards, e.g. the EUREPGAP certification. One hypothesis is that the 
introduction of the EUREPGAP certification in Morocco could have poverty-reducing effects. 
Due to the structure of the Moroccan tomato sector, only a few producers receive much of the 
quota rent. By means of higher environmental and occupational health and safety standards 
implied by EUREPGAP, however, part of the rent could be distributed to workers in the 
tomato sector through higher wages and better working standards (Chemnitz, 2007).  
EU preferences for tomatoes from Morocco are an example of trade creation rather than trade 
diversion. Due to its favorable geographic location with respect to transportation as well as 
climatic conditions, Morocco is a competitive supplier to the EU and could gain from a 
further liberalization of the EU’s MFN policies for tomatoes. Even though Morocco would on 
the one hand lose its quota rent, it could, on the other hand, expand its quantity of exports and 
would gain more flexibility to react to price changes on the EU market or to meet the 
demands of clients. The resulting net welfare effect for the Moroccan export tomato sector 
depends on i) the size of the current quota rent and any inefficiencies tied to it, ii) the EU 
import demand elasticity for tomatoes, iii) the export supply elasticity of Moroccan tomatoes, 




Because of market size, it can be assumed that the EU import elasticity with respect to the 
Moroccan export tomato price is high, and thus the EU price effect of an expansion of 
Moroccan tomato exports will be low.
23
 Therefore, the gains for Morocco are likely to 
outweigh the losses.  
Yet the gains for Morocco may be limited, as the export elasticity of Moroccan tomatoes is 
closely correlated to the availability of water in the main production areas, as tomatoes require 
considerable amounts of water. In 1992 more than 92% of total water use in Morocco was for 
agricultural production (FAO, 2005). Export tomatoes are always produced in greenhouses 
with irrigation systems. At present about 12% of the usable surface area is irrigated and there 
is only limited potential to extend irrigation. Recent surveys indicate that about 1.36 million 
hectares are irrigated, corresponding to 15% of the usable area (with about 139,000 ha in the 
main production region of Souss Massa), of which 30% are irrigated with drip irrigation 
(WTO, 2003). As Morocco has faced difficult droughts in recent years, total water resources 
have already declined tremendously. The Souss Massa, with an annual rainfall of 200 mm, 
has an average annual water deficit of 260 m
3
, which leads to an annual drop in groundwater 
levels of 0.5 to 2 meters (Agence du Bassin Hydraulique de Souss Massa, 2005). Even though 
the declining groundwater level has the greatest effect on the traditional sectors in the short 
run, it also affects the production cost of the tomato export sector by increasing costs if water 
must be pumped from greater depths. Furthermore, the policies of the Moroccan 
administration are changing in response to this problem. At the moment a significant part of 
agricultural subsidies goes directly into irrigation systems. Today’s private water prices 
represent no more than 56-83% of the social cost, including the maintenance of irrigation 
systems (WTO, 2003). In 2002 the Moroccan government implemented a price of €0.002/m
3
 
for water used for agriculture. As the price is very low and largely symbolic in nature, it may 
be increased in the future. A water pricing policy which reflects the social cost of providing 
water to farmers may thus result in a significant decline in the current quota rent. 
 
                                                 
23 Assuming the EU supply elasticity at 2 and the EU demand elasticity at 0.5, and calculating the EU import 
demand elasticity according to Blackhurst (1973), one reaches an import elasticity of about 40. A doubling 
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Abstract 
The concern exists that small producers’ participation in the fruit and vegetable trade could be 
diminishing as a result of the increasing prevalence of food quality standards. This paper 
analyzes two particular questions with regard to the distributional effects of standards: 
1) which producers comply, and which do not; and 2) why do some producers comply while 
others do not? Therefore the paper analyzes and compares the decision process of 
EUREPGAP certified and non-certified producers in the Moroccan tomato sector.  
Results of the survey show that being small in size tends to be overvalued in the discussion. 
Instead, the results point to the fact that less vertically integrated farmers in the value chain 
tend to be less favored, especially as forward integration diminishes the cost of compliance. 
Forward integration in the value chain is of particular importance because of the direct access 
to information on market developments and the buyers’ requirements.  
 





Fruit and vegetable sectors are principally seen as sectors where small producers are able to 
participate due to their low demand on land and their high labor requirements. However, the 
concern exists that small producers’ participation in the international fruit and vegetable trade 
could be diminishing as a result of the increasing prevalence of food quality standards in the 
sector. Standards define the terms of chain membership, imply rules and conditions for 
participation, and hence lead to processes of (re)distribution within the chain (Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005). For some producers, standards may open up new opportunities as they permit 
market access to particular market segments. At the same time, the process of (re)distributing 
market shares is accompanied by marginalization and exclusion, as standards may impose 
prohibitively high barriers for certain producers in terms of the short-term and long-term 
efforts needed for production under certification. This is particularly relevant since 
certification with private standards has become a major requirement for participation in fruit 
and vegetable markets worldwide. One of the most important private standards for fruit and 
vegetables is the EUREPGAP standard, which has now become quasi-mandatory for several 
export destinations (USAID, 2005).  
This paper aims to analyze two particular questions with regard to the distributional effects of 
standards: 1) which producers comply, and which do not; and 2) why do some producers 
comply while others do not?  
With respect to the first question, various surveys have mentioned the particular difficulties 
facing small producers within this new trading environment (e.g. Humphrey et al. 2004; 
Kleinwechter and Grethe 2006; Maertens and Swinnen 2006; World Bank 2005). However, 
most of these surveys have hypothesized that small producers are disadvantaged within the 
new trading environment on theoretical grounds without actually providing empirical 
evidence for this assertion. 
Regarding the second question, various papers have argued, based on the theoretical 
background of economies of scale, that small producers tend to comply to a lesser extent 
because of the higher cost of compliance. Even though this argument may well be to some 
extent true, it can be criticized because it neglects the complex socio-economic and 
institutional framework that influences a farmer’s decision to comply with a standard. 
A multidisciplinary perspective is necessary to analyze decisions to adopt or not to adopt a 
standard, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of why some producers comply with food 
quality standards while others reject them.  
This paper accordingly seeks to contribute to the debate by answering these two questions 




analysis of the compliance decision behavior and the compliance process. The survey 
analyzes drivers for the compliance decision by comparing the determinants of the decision 
process of non-certified producers with those of certified ones. 
For its explanatory approach, this paper mainly draws on the theories of innovation adoption 
and diffusion research, since these make it possible to systemize the decision process and 
integrate it into a close network of economic, social and institutional determinants.  
The Moroccan tomato sector was chosen as the case study because of the increasing 
importance of private certification in this sector. Nearly 90% of its tomatoes are exported to 
the EU, where EUREPGAP is a major requirement. Tomatoes are the second most important 
horticultural export product of the country, and a wide range of producers are involved in the 
sector, from large-scale plantations cultivating more than 200 ha, to small producers with less 
than 10 ha. In addition, the sector has a particular social importance in that it offers income 
possibilities to those with little access to land, and moreover provides possibilities of 
employment in rural areas, where there tend to be few other alternative jobs.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background of the analysis, applying diffusion theory to the compliance process with food 
quality standards. Section 3 describes the methodology of the survey, including the theoretical 
framework and the data collection. Section 4 provides an overview of the structural and 
institutional environment of the Moroccan tomato sector, in order to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the compliance process. Section 5 discusses the results of the survey. 
Section 6 examines the similarities and differences among compliers and non-compliers. 
Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions with regard to the impact of food quality standards 
on rural poverty in Morocco.  
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Standards – Innovations from the Producer Perspective 
Different approaches offer a variety of evidence to explain decision behavior and the decision 
process. With regard to the objective of the survey, a multidisciplinary analytical approach 
offers the possibility of linking the individual decision process to the effects of the 
institutional environment and thus of identifying drivers for or against compliance with food 
quality standards. Diffusion theory offers a particularly suitable analytical framework that 
identifies the determinants of the innovativeness of the actors involved.  
Diffusion theory is appropriate because food quality standards are, from a producer’s 




idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual. In this context, diffusion 
theory can be applied to various process innovations in agricultural food chains.  
However, there are some differences, as innovations from a traditional perspective lead to an 
increase in technical efficiency. By contrast, innovations in food quality typically result in 
higher food quality and/or in better information transfer of information on products and 
processes, but do not necessarily lead to some form of production advantage. Indeed, such 
innovations may actually be counterproductive to the technical production process of the firm 
(Walgenbach and Beck, 2003). Food quality innovations only result in gains if the higher 
quality product is differentiable from lower quality products.
24
  
With regard to the information asymmetry existing in the food trade
25
, quality standards are 
used to overcome these market failures. Nadvi and Wältring (2002: 6) define standards as 
agreed criteria by which a product or service performance, its technical and physical 
characteristics and/or the process and conditions under which it has been produced or 
delivered, can be assessed. Standards may consist of individual measures, or can take the form 
of a bunch of different measures which the producer has to fulfill and which are externally 
audited. Consequently, food standards not only consist of innovations – the standard itself is a 
form of innovation.  
2.2 Applying the Innovation Decision Model to the Compliance Process 
with Food Standards – Strengths and Weaknesses  
Diffusion research identifies three time dimensions: 1) the innovativeness of an individual in 
relation to the other members of a social system; 2) the adoption rate within a social system; 
and 3) the decision process (König, 2006). This subsection concentrates on the third of these 
dimensions, the decision process.  
Rogers (2003: 168) defines the decision process as an information-seeking and information-
processing activity in which an individual is motivated to reduce uncertainty about the 
advantages and disadvantages of an innovation.  
Diffusion research relies on the assumption of a multistage decision model. Rogers (2003) has 
developed a five-stage model where the decision-making unit passes from hearing about an 
innovation for the first time, to forming an attitude towards the innovation, on to deciding 
                                                 
24 Akerlof (1972) explored this phenomenon for the “lemons” market.  
25 This asymmetry results from the fact that food products include various quality aspects, e.g. technical 
value, sensory quality, nutritional value, food safety as well as idealistic and psychological values 
(Brockmeier, 1993; Wiegand, 1997). The technical value and the sensory quality assessed by the consumer, 
and the nutritional value and food safety can be assessed in the final product by third parties (via laboratory 
tests); however, most idealistic values are Potemkin attributes (Tietzel and Weber, 1991) and cannot be 




whether to adopt or to reject it, to implementing the new idea, and finally to confirming this 
decision.  
The decision model provides three main advantages when it comes to analyzing the 
compliance process with food standards. Firstly, it clearly systemizes the decision process, 
distinguishing the different stages of the whole process and thereby making it possible to 
identify the determinants of the decision process, which might differ according to the stage. 
Secondly, the model puts the decision-maker at the center of the analysis, while at the same 
time taking interlinkages with the institutional environment into account. Thirdly, it combines 
various schools of thinking, including those of economics, education, rural sociology and 
geography to form an analytical framework of diffusion (Rogers, 2003).  
However, the model can be criticized for formulating a relatively simplistic view of both the 
decision process and the final decision to adopt or reject an innovation. It is a mistake to see 
the decision process as linear; instead, it can be paused and rethought at every stage (Rogers, 
2003). In addition, the model treats the adoption decision as a bivariate variable, where the 
only two possible options are either to comply or to reject. In reality, this decision is much 
more nuanced, and various potential responses exist. For compliance with food standards, 
Henson and Heasman (1998) explore compliance, which they show ranges from no-
compliance to partial compliance and finally to full compliance. Kleinwechter (2005) even 
mentions over-compliance with standards, whereby larger firms in particular seek to obtain a 
marketing advantage.  
Furthermore, the shortcomings of the decision model regarding the analysis of food safety 
innovations are reflected in the diffusion process, which excludes some aspects which are of 
major importance for the diffusion process of food standards. Rogers (2003: 5) defines 
diffusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system. Even though this definition covers much of 
what is important for the analysis of the compliance process with food quality standards, it is 
important to note the aspects that the definition does not include. Four major shortcomings 
can be identified in this regard.  
First, as Strang and Meyer (1993) show, the definition excludes decision-making processes 
where actors’ choices were not informed by the activities and choices of others. This aspect is 
of particular relevance for the compliance process with food safety and quality standards of 
small producers, who are extremely dependent on external sources of information (Henson 
and Heasman, 1998; Yapp and Freeman, 2004). A large enterprise may internally generate 
information, whereas a small enterprise is rather in the position of a recipient of information. 
With respect to compliance with food quality standards, this implies that whenever external 





Second, the diffusion process has been widely criticized for underestimating the institutional 
environment. Diffusion theory mainly concentrates on internal production processes, thereby 
failing to give the institutional environment of the decision-making unit sufficient importance 
(Walgenbach and Beck, 2003). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pronounce the importance of 
institutional isomorphism
26
 for the diffusion process. Walgenbach and Beck (2003) analyze 
this phenomenon in their survey of compliance decision processes with the ISO 9000 standard 
in Germany. They show that enterprises under uncertainty tend to conform more closely to the 
institutional expectations of their trading partners. Rational conformity with efficiency aspects 
of the production process is becoming less important, while the importance of institutional 
legitimacy which is guaranteed by homogeneous institutional structure is correspondingly 
increasing.  
Third, the importance of concepts such as governance and pressure tend to be underestimated 
within value chains. Diffusion research includes the impact of the social system
27
 with its 
horizontal network interrelations, norms and ethical values in the analysis (Rogers, 2003), but 
it does not provide an analytical framework to analyze it (König, 2006). Diffusion research 
has neglected in particular vertical coordination and vertical relations, including concepts of 
governance and power among participants of a value chain, even though vertical relations are 
known to be particularly important for information transmission (from the buyer to the 
producer) and in terms of pushing decision-making units in a certain direction (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002). Vertical relations have been analyzed in particular in value-chain analysis 
literature, which analyzes the cross-border linkages between firms in global production (e.g. 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  
Fourth, diffusion research has been criticized for failing to take into consideration the 
dynamic interdependencies between the individual and its environment and their alternating 
effects (König, 2006: 101), despite the fact that these are seen as an important aspect 
explaining technological and structural development in the agricultural sector (König, 2006).  
                                                 
26 Institutional isomorphism is defined as the tendency of institutions to form an homogeneous environment 
(Walgenbach and Beck, 2003: 499).  
27 A social system is a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem-solving to accomplish a 




3 Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1 The Analytical Framework 
The theoretical discussion has explored the explanatory potential of diffusion theory for the 
analysis. However, with respect to the shortcomings discussed in Section 2, the perspective of 
the decision model has been modified in order to make it easier to recognize the interlinkages 
between the decision-making unit and the institutional environment.  
Figure 1:  Analytical framework  
Source: own illustration 
Figure 1 shows that the decision process is, to a large extent, not directly affected by the 
determinant variables, but also indirectly through the perceived value of the standard. The 
perceived value of compliance can be considered as belief in the costs and benefits related to 
the innovation (Frambach and Schillewaert, 1999, DeSarbo et al., 1998). The perceived value 
of compliance must offer some kind of social, institutional or economic incentive for the 
decision-making unit to consider adoption seriously. Imperfect information may lead to a 
difference between the perceived value and the real value of compliance. This difference is 
called the error cost (Ogus, 1992).  
The decision process is determined by uncertainty, since the decision-making unit can never 
be informed about all the causal linkages in the decision situation, and it bases its decision on 
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assumptions of future developments (e.g. market development). The extent to which the 
decision-making unit experiences uncertainty as an impending factor for the decision process 
mainly depends on personal characteristics and the complexity of the decision. 
Each stage of the decision model is represented by a dependent variable which is determined 
directly or indirectly by the three groups of determinants, as Figure 1 shows. At the 
knowledge stage, the dependent variable is represented by the cost of information. These 
represent the costs incurred by the decision-making unit in order to receive a certain level of 
information which is sufficient to formulate an attitude towards the standard. The level of 
knowledge needed to formulate an attitude may differ tremendously among producers, 
however. At the attitude stage and the decision stage, the dependent variables can turn out to 
be positive or negative. Both stages are affected indirectly by the determinants through the 
perceived value of compliance. On the implementation stage, the dependent variables are the 
cost and benefit of compliance. The producers face at this stage for the first time the real cost 
of compliance (except for the cost of information during the knowledge stage). The benefit of 
compliance is seldom immediately apparent, since investments in food quality standards are 
of a long-term nature. The same takes place at the monitoring stage. This is partly affected by 
the real costs and benefits of compliance, as well as the perceived costs and benefits related to 
future market development.  
3.2 Data Collection  
Research data were collected in 2006 by conducting semi-structured interviews with 63 
Moroccan tomato producers in the region of Souss Massa (which was chosen because more 
than 70% of total tomato exports come from this zone). The survey concentrates on the 
EUREPGAP standards, since EUREPGAP has turned out to be the most important private 
certificate at the farm level in trading relations with EU partners.  
The total sample was taken out of a population of around 600 producers which supply at least 
partly the export market (APEFEL, 2006) of which around 207 are EUREPGAP-certified 
(EUREPGAP, 2006). To guarantee a sufficiently high number of EUREPGAP-certified 
producers, the total sample was split into two sub-samples: one certified (30 interviewees) and 
the other not certified (33 interviewees). 
A questionnaire was developed for the two sample groups which contains a qualitative as well 
as a quantitative part. The questionnaire was developed with respect to the theoretical 
framework discussed in subsection 3.1 and aims at collecting data on the determinants of the 
decision process.  
The analysis of the data consists of two major steps. First, data were analyzed in order to 




analysis sought to identify particular differences among the two groups of compliers and non-
compliers.  
Before turning to the discussion of the results in Section 5, the following section will briefly 
provide an overview of the structure of the Moroccan tomato sector.  
4 The Moroccan Tomato Sector 
4.1 Economic Importance and Structure of the Moroccan Tomato Sector 
Horticulture is one of the most relevant segments of the Moroccan agricultural sector. In 
addition to its economic importance, the sector is also socially important, accounting for a 
high share in rural employment (WTO, 2003). Within the horticultural sector, tomato 
production plays an important role. The Moroccan tomato sector has a dual structure. 
Production for the domestic and export markets is usually separated. While tomatoes for the 
export market are always produced in technically highly advanced production systems in 
plastic greenhouses, tomatoes for the national market mainly stem from open field production.  
Nevertheless, interlinkages exist on both sides. Tomatoes originally produced for the export 
market but which are not of sufficient quality are finally sold on the national market. And 
greenhouse producers which mostly supply the domestic market sell their products to the 
export market whenever there is demand (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  
While open-field production for the domestic market takes place all over the country, the 
production of greenhouse tomatoes is mainly located in a regional cluster in the south Atlantic 
coastal strip in the region of Souss Massa. About 64% of the area is located in the region and 
74% of total production originates there (APEFEL, 2002).  
Tomatoes rank second on Morocco’s export list of agricultural goods, with an annual export 
value of € 118 million in 2003 (FAO, 2007). On average, in 2003/04 and 2004/05 Morocco 
exported 228,738.50 tons of tomatoes, of which 207,158.50 tons were destined for the EU 
(EACCE, 2007).  
Around 30% of tomato producers are small scale farmers who cultivate less than 5 ha. Their 
production area represents only about 10-15% of the total production area for early tomatoes. 
The majority of the producers cultivate an area between 5-20 ha. Farms belonging to this 
group cultivate around 50% of the total tomato area. Only 10-15% of the farms are larger than 
20 ha, but they represent around 40% of the early tomato area (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  
The production and marketing chain can be subdivided into three major levels: the production 
or farm level, the packing level, and the exporting level. The Moroccan export sector shows a 




Figure 2:  Structure of the Moroccan tomato sector  
Source: Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005.  
As shown in Figure 2 the largest part of production, between 40 and 55%, is produced in 
completely integrated export structures. These may either take the form of producers of 
various sizes, which are organized into farmers’ cooperatives at the packing station level, or 
in enterprises which contain all levels of the production and marketing chain (Chemnitz and 
Grethe, 2005). The second important organizational form of the sector is that of semi-
integrated exporters. These are large enterprises which have their own private packing stations 
where they process products from their own farms. In addition, these enterprises process and 
sell tomatoes from other producers on a commission basis (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005). The 
least important organizational form of the sector is that of the non-integrated exporters, which 
represent less than 10% of the exported early tomatoes. These exporters take the tomatoes on 
a commission basis or buy them from several different small and medium-sized producers. 
There are around 12-15 exporter groups in the sector, of which the largest three export around 
70% of total tomato exports (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  
4.2 Prevalence of Legal and Private Food Standards in the Moroccan 
Export Sector  
Since Moroccan exports concentrate on the European market, production is mainly 
determined by the legal and private requirements of EU buyers. While food safety, hygiene, 
traceability, social and environmental requirements are comparatively new, marketing 
standards for tomatoes for the EU market have been in place since the early 1970s. EU 









































tomatoes imported to the European market. To date, the EU’s acceptance of the maximum 
residue levels (MRL) of pesticide products and its requirements for traceability are of specific 
importance for the sector. The so-called umbrella regulation 178/2002 (OJ L 031, 01/02/2002) 
lays down the general principles and requirements of EU food law on all stages of production, 
processing and distribution. The most relevant articles for the Moroccan export sector are 
Articles 11-14 about food safety requirements, and Articles 14-20 about traceability 
requirements which came into force on 1 January 2005. Since January 2006 the umbrella 
regulation has been complemented by Regulation 882/2004 on official food and feed controls 
(OJ L 165/1, 30/04/2004). Finally, Regulation 90/642 fixes maximum levels d for pesticide 
residues in and on fruits and vegetables (OJ L 350, 14/12/90).  
However, private food quality initiatives are increasingly becoming more important than the 
legal food standards. In the Moroccan tomato export sector, the most important private 
certificate at the farm level is the EUREPGAP standard.
28
 The normative documents 
representing the EUREPGAP standard include aspects of integrated pest management, 
traceability, hygiene measures and MRLs.  
The importance of EUREPGAP to the EU market varies among individual member countries. 
According to several interviewees, the UK and the Scandinavian countries require the highest 
quality standards. Most retailers in these countries demand, in addition to EUREPGAP 
certification, private certificates from the particular buyer (e.g. Tesco’s “Natures Choice” and 
Marks & Spencer’s “From Farm to Fork”). By contrast, interviewees characterized the 
French, German, Spanish and Swiss markets as being in a state of transition; retailers prefer 
buying EUREPGAP-certified produce, but are still prepared to buy non-certified products 
when no EUREPGAP-certified products are available.  
In Morocco, the number of certified producers has increased tremendously in recent years. To 
start off, some producers were certified in 2002 but, in the following two years, only a few 
other large producers followed (APEFEL, 2006). The rapid increase in certification only 
started in 2005. Today, around 207 out of 600 producers are certified (EUREPGAP, 2006). 
An unpublished survey conducted by APEFEL (2006) announced that in quantitative terms, 
Morocco could supply more than three-quarters of its exported tomatoes as EUREPGAP-
certified. The largest ten exporters
29
 can supply 140,000 tons of EUREPGAP-certified 
tomatoes and own nearly 1,000 ha of certified greenhouses (APEFEL, 2006). Hence, a 
tremendous gap exists in the Moroccan export sector regarding the certified quantity and the 
number of certified producers.  
                                                 
28 The most important standard for packing stations is the BRC (British Retailer Consortium) certificate.  




Various interviewees indicated that most very large exporters tend to be EUREPGAP-
certified, whereas the picture is more heterogeneous for medium and small producers. The 
following section analyzes why producers finally decide to comply – or not to comply – with 
the EUREPGAP standard.  
5 Compliance with Food Safety Requirements: Results of the Survey 
5.1 The Information Stage 
The cost of information reflects the monetary and physical efforts the decision-making unit 
has to undertake to receive a certain level of information that is needed to formulate an 
attitude towards the standard. Information costs can be split into two groups: 1) costs for 
initial awareness information; and 2) costs for knowledge information (Rogers, 2003).  
Awareness information captures all the efforts the decision-making unit has to make in order 
to find out about the possible options for a decision, and it has to feel the need to enter into a 
decision process. Regarding compliance with food quality standards, the “awareness 
information” is defined as the first knowledge that a producer has of the existence and 
importance of a standard. This information on food standards may be transmitted to the 
producer by several means such as extension services, trading partners, mass media, as well 
by personal relations with other participants in the sector. The more communication about a 
certain standard is included in the communication structure of the sector, the less individual 
efforts producers have to make to find out something about it. However, the awareness 
information proves to be the first major burden of compliance in many cases, especially for 
producers that tend to be less included in information channels, that have less access to 
modern sources of information, and that are unable to find out information by themselves. 
The survey results show that knowledge of public standards such as MRLs and Traceability 
has been widespread in the sector for more than five years. The picture is slightly different 
regarding knowledge of the EUREPGAP standard. Even though all interviewees bar one 
knew of EUREPGAP, most (30%) indicated that they had only known about it for a year. A 
further 27% had known about EUREPGAP for two years, and 17% for three years. Finally, 
most interviewees (70%) knew nothing about more specific standards such as “Nature’s 
Choice” (Tesco) or “From Farm to Fork” (Marks and Spencer).  
These results indicate that public standards as well as EUREPGAP are part of the 
communication structure of the sector, and that information on the existence of standards is 
communicated horizontally within the sector. Both the certified and non-certified interviewees 
indicated that the group of “other producers” was the most important source of initial 
information on the standard. As the second important source of information, certified 




of phytosanitary products. This difference suggests that there are structural differences between 
certified and non-certified producers, with the former tending to receive information from 
downstream actors along the value chain, while the latter tend to receive information from 
horizontally involved participants.  
The two groups differ further vis-à-vis the principal source of information on EUREPGAP, as 
Figure 3 shows.  






















 certified producers,  non certified producers. 
Source: own elaboration 
Nearly all certified producers indicated that packing stations or consulting organizations were 
their major source of information. The group of non-certified producers also stated that 
packing stations were their principal source of information on EUREPGAP, followed by the 
categories of other producers and phytosanitary vendors. However, even though both groups 
reported that packing stations were their most important source of information, non-certified 
producers possess less information on EUREPGAP. This can be interpreted in two different 
ways: either certification leads to better knowledge of the standard, or the certified producers 
possessed better knowledge of the standard to start with, which finally was the main reason 
why they decided to become certified. 
One reason why certified producers tend to receive more detailed information on EUREPGAP 





Table 1:  Producers’ integration in the value chain 
 
Owner  
of a station 
Not the owner  
of a station Total 
Certified 22 8 30 
Non-certified 6 27 33 
Total 28 35 63 
Source: own calculations. 
As Table 1 shows, 73% of certified producers are involved at the higher chain level. This 
might take the form of being a member of a cooperative or being the owner of a company.  
Packing stations employ quality managers who accompany the compliance process of their 
members. Consequently, the costs of information are indirect at the farm level. The 
certification process was not supported according to any of the interviews without the 
integration of the producer in the downstream level. 
Certified producers which do not receive support from the packing station internalize the 
generation of the needed knowledge for the certification process by hiring consultant 
organizations. These supply “packages” contain consulting for the entire upgrading process, 
including all relevant steps up to the final external audit. Complete “EUREPGAP packages” 
cost, depending on the size of the farm, between 2,000 and 3,000 €.  
To conclude, the results of the survey show that the costs of obtaining initial information on 
the EUREPGAP standard are relatively low as the standard is commonly encountered in the 
daily communication of the sector. More specific information on the standard, however, has 
to be generated internally by the producer, either by hiring a production level consultancy or 
at the packing station level.  
5.2 The Attitude Stage  
The information stage is followed by the attitude stage, in which the decision-making unit 
forms an opinion on the standard. This reflects how it experiences the potential benefits and 
perceived value of compliance, which are mainly affected by how the decision-making unit 
perceives uncertainty regarding its knowledge of future costs and benefits.  
This depends on the personal characteristics of the decision-making unit as well as on the 
external influence on the producer. The way that non-certified decision-making units 
experience the costs, benefits and risks of the standard and the feasibility of becoming a 
certified producer plays an important role in the process of formulating an attitude, especially 
since small producers often lack the possibility to receive information from various different 




Table 2:  Benefit of the EUREPGAP standard as experienced by non-certified producers  
Benefit of EUREPGAP Number of responses 
Better prices  3 
Preferential supplier status 0 
Better commercialization 6 
Other benefits  2 
No known producer with a direct benefit 22 
Source: own calculations. 
As Table 2 shows, non-certified producers believe the benefit of the EUREPGAP certification 
to other producers to be relatively low, with only 11 interviewees aware of someone who had 
benefited from certification. The most important benefits for certified producers according to 
non-certified producers are “better possibilities for commercialization”. Only two 
interviewees however indicated that they knew someone who receives better prices due to 
certification.  
In contrast to this rather negative experience of their colleagues’ certification, nearly all non-
certified interviewees had a positive attitude towards certification. Except for one interviewee, 
all producers underlined their willingness to be certified whenever given the chance to do so.  
The most important motivation for certification is the fear of losing future market share, a 
concern stressed by 29 out of the 33 non-certified interviewees. However, the risk of losing 
market share in the future seems to be relatively abstract to most non-EUREPGAP certified 
producers, with 88% indicating that they had never faced or heard of any sanctions because of 
their non-compliance. As depicted in Table 3, only three producers indicated that they face 
disadvantages in the near future because of non-certification. One of them receives lower 
prices, while the other two will be excluded from the packing station if they fail to start the 
certification process in 2007.  
Table 3:  Sanctions in case of non-compliance  
 Changing the producer Better prices No sanctions No answer Total 
Certified 22 0 7 1 30 
Non-certified 2 1 29 1 33 
Total 24 1 36 2 63 
Source: own calculations.  
In contrast, the analysis of those producers that were certified shows that 22 out of 30 
interviewees face sanctions from their packing station in case of non-compliance. All 22 
producers indicated that they risked losing market share in case of non-compliance, as their 




Summarizing the results of the attitude stage, the survey shows that most non-certified 
interviewees tend to be positive towards the EUREPGAP standard even though they 
experience the direct benefit of certified producers as marginal. A general concern exists that 
they could lose market share in case of non-compliance. However, the survey results suggest 
that non-certified producers experience market losses as a relatively abstract idea.  
5.3 The Decision Stage 
In the decision stage the producer actively undertakes activities which finally lead to a 
positive or negative decision (Rogers, 2003). This might entail for example actively searching 
for information about the standard, or developing a deeper understanding of the specific steps 
needed to implement the standard at farm level.  
28 out of the 33 non-certified producers indicated that they had relatively concrete knowledge 
about the changes needed on their farm for compliance, and 20 even expressed concrete ideas 
about the level of investment needed.
30
  



















Source: own calculations. 
Figure 3 depicts the extremely high variance of perceived costs among non-certified 
interviewees. The lowest perceived cost of compliance amounts to less than 50 €/ha, and the 
highest at around 1,975 €/ha.  
                                                 
30 It is important to outline that the survey does not assess whether the perceived cost corresponds to the 




The reasons why interviewees perceived the cost of compliance so differently varied, ranging 
from personal characteristics to the actual technical level of production to knowledge on the 
EUREPGAP standard. The survey results point to the fact that more informed interviewees 
indicated higher perceived compliance costs.  
Even though nearly all non-certified producers tended to have a positive attitude towards the 
standard (as expressed by their indication to become certified if the opportunity arises), none 
had finally taken a positive decision in favor of certification. As the main reasons for non-
certification, the interviewees indicated insufficient information on EUREPGAP and a lack of 
financial capacity. However, answers related to a lack of information on EUREPGAP have to 
be interpreted carefully, since all producers could theoretically hire a consulting organization 
to provide them with better information and to accompany the certification process. 
Consequently, the “lack of information” may also be another way of expressing a lack of 
financial capacity.  
The lack of financial capacity as a reason for non-compliance seems convincing, since the 
largest part of short-term investment is required for technical upgrading of farms, and these 
costs have to be met immediately. Even though some producers receive credits from their 
cooperatives, access to credit remains difficult, especially for small, less organized and less 
educated farmers. The third obstacle to certification experienced by producers is the 
uncertainty they face in terms of highly fluctuating prices. This is especially true for 
producers without a steady relationship with buyers or packing stations. Interviewees stated 
that in order to become certified, they would need a firm guarantee on prices and quantity.  
To sum up, most non-certified interviewees have concrete ideas on the requirements of the 
EUREGPGAP standard. Nevertheless, none have decided in favor of certification up till now, 
which can largely be attributed to their reluctance to invest owing to uncertainty about price 
developments and export possibilities. All interviewees found the idea of certification rather 
abstract, and they do not see a direct need for certification as the benefits of certification 




5.4 The Implementation Stage 
In the implementation stage, producers are for the first time confronted with the real costs and 
benefits of the standard. Figure 4 depicts the real costs of compliance for the certified 
interviewees.  



















  recurrent cost ٱ ,non-recurrent cost ٱ
Source: own calculations. 
The costs of compliance can be broken down into recurrent and non-recurrent costs. Even 
though most interviewees experience non-recurrent costs as more of an obstacle, they only 
add a small part to the total cost of compliance. The major cost components of non-recurrent 
costs are investments in the technical upgrading process of the farm (e.g. in buildings and 
markers).
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 By contrast, the largest component of the recurrent costs of compliance is 
additional costs for skilled labor. Only four producers indicated that they did not employ any 
additional labor at all. On average, certified producers employ one or two additional skilled 
workers for every 15 ha. A skilled worker earns between 200 and 250 €/month. Other 
recurrent cost components, such as the certificate for the standard or investment in safety 
cloth, only add a small part to the total cost of compliance. 
Figure 4 shows that the degree of variance regarding compliance costs is strong. The 
minimum costs of compliance are about 35 €/ha per year, while the maximum cost of 
compliance are nearly 1,500 €/ha per year. To explain the high level of variance, data were 
                                                 




analyzed with respect to farm size as a potential determinant for cost differences among 
producers. 
A negative correlation of -0.589
32
 is identified between the variables of farm size and cost of 
compliance per ha and year. The survey results suggest that large-scale farms benefit from 
economies of scale both in terms of non-recurrent costs (-0.558) as well as in recurrent ones (-
0.327). However, the degree of correlation only ranges between low and medium, which 
indicates that non-recurrent costs are influenced more by other determinants than by farm size 
(i.e. the technical level before compliance).  
Furthermore, the data show a low level of correlation between recurrent cost and farm size. 
The largest component of the recurrent cost is additional labor costs. Even though some very 
small farms face relatively high additional labor costs per ha, no significant negative 
correlation is found between the size of the farm and labor costs per ha and year.  
Another factor mentioned by Kleinwechter (2005) that has a relevant effect on the cost of 
compliance is the intention of the producer to which level he wants to upgrade its farm. Even 
though 34% of the producers indicate greater compliance in at least one category of the 
EUREPGAP protocol, no significant correlation is found among the compliance level and the 
cost per ha and year.  
Analysis of how certified producers benefit shows that they experience very varied benefits 
from compliance. The largest number of interviewees (41.0%) indicated that certification had 
only brought them medium benefits
33
, compared with an almost equal number who stated that 
they had received high to very high benefits (27.6%) or low to very low benefits (26.0%). 
Table 4 below breaks down the benefits and perceived benefits of certified producers 
according to category.  
                                                 
32 Correlation is calculated by Sperman’s ROH, since both variables were not normally distributed.  
33 On a scale from 1 to 8, high benefits are those that range between 7 and 8; medium benefits between 3 and 




Table 4:  Benefits of EUREPGAP certification 
 Responses 
Benefits of certified producers Nr. Percent 
Better prices 2 3.7% 
Better marketing conditions 13 24.1% 
Better market access 7 13.0% 
Better prices in future 1 1.9% 
New market access in future 9 16.7% 
EUREPGAP minimizes the risk of losing market share 22 40.7% 
Total 54 100.0% 
Source: own calculations 
Only two producers indicated that they have received better prices since they became 
certified. However, both underline that certification alone does not change prices. Rather, new 
marketing strategies that accompany certification bring about higher prices by opening up 
new markets. However, several interviewees stated that, especially in the 2005/6 export 
season, prices had decreased tremendously, regardless of whether producers were certified or 
not. This finally led to the unfortunate fact that most producers that became certified in 2005 
received lower prices with certification than prior to certification in 2004.  
In terms of marketing, 13 producers indicated that they had better marketing possibilities with 
the certificate, while another 10 interviewees hoped to have better marketing conditions in the 
future. Most interviewees however stated that the most important benefit of EUREPGAP is 
that it minimizes the risk of potential market share losses. The potential of losing market share 
is seen as a very concrete threat in case of non-certification. As shown in Table 2 (subsection 
5.2), 22 out of 30 producers fear losing customers in case of non-certification.  
The results of the implementation stage can be summarized as follows. First, compliance costs 
are only weakly correlated with farm size. Second, EUREPGAP functions as an additional 
marketing argument regarding the benefits of compliance. However, the benefits of 
certification depend on the marketing strategy adopted: it is not the certification itself which 




6 Similarities and Differences among Compliers and Non-compliers  
This section aims to analyze whether any patterns exist for compliers and non-compliers.  
The survey results affirm the existing assumption that large farms are certified to a larger 
extent than small and medium-sized farms. The two latter groups show a very diverse picture. 
While all bar three of the farms in the sample larger than 25 ha are EUREPGAP-certified, no 
particular pattern is apparent for farms between 5 and 25 ha.  
There are various reasons for the strong tendency on the part of large farms to become 
certified. According to the interviewees, certification primarily matters in order to fulfill the 
“wishes” of the trading partners. Hence, certification of large farms rather reflects the 
producers willingness and their understanding of the importance of the quality of their 
products to their trading partners. However, various interviewees of very large farms 
indicated that the EUREPGAP certification is probably not particularly necessary in order to 
guarantee the products quality as consumers in any case trust the high quality of their products 
as a result of the direct and constant contact that large-scale farms tend to have with their 
trading partners.  
In contrast, certification of smaller farms which lack the direct contact to their buyers would 
increase their level of conformity and open up possibilities for strategic horizontal 
partnerships and for vertical coordination. As the picture for farms between 5 and 25 ha 
regarding certification is particularly varied, following discriminant analysis particularly 
concentrates on this group. Five main statements can be made in this regard. 
1) Certified farms show a higher level of vertical integration. Discriminant analysis shows 
highly significant differences among certified and non-certified producers related to their 
level of vertical integration. While 75% of certified producers were integrated at the 
downstream level, only 12% of the non-certified producers were. This highly significant 
difference underlines the importance of vertical integration – or at least vertical 
coordination – in guaranteeing the information flow between producers and consumers in 
both directions. It seems that direct contact to clients in particular often leads to a positive 
decision regarding certification. This is again underlined by the fact that 81% of certified 
producers indicated that they had experienced sanctions in case of non-compliance, 
compared with only 33% of non-certified producers. Consequently, the survey results hint 
that even though size plays an important role, it is largely the organizational level which 
leads to a positive decision being taken by small to medium-sized farms.  
2) Certified producers cooperate with certified packing stations. Another highly significant 
difference among certified and non-certified farms is the quality level of downstream 




British Retail Consortium (BRC), whereas only 11% of non-certified producers had trading 
relations with certified packing stations. This underlines how important the consistent 
fulfillment of quality requirements is along the whole value chain. Several interview 
partners stated that EUREPGAP certification without certification of the downstream actor 
makes no sense from a marketing perspective.  
3) Certified producers have seen their market share develop positively over the last five years. 
Diffusion theory assumes that innovations take place in economically increasing branches 
of an industry. This assumption could be verified in the survey, since 75% of the certified 
producers indicated that they had benefited from positive exports within the last five years, 
compared with only 23% of non-certified producers. 
4) Certified producers employ skilled workers. At least one highly skilled person works on 
88% of certified farms; by contrast, only 24% of non-certified farms employ highly 
qualified employees. The employment of highly skilled workers tends to be of particular 
importance since the compliance with EUREPGAP demands a certain level of human 
capital not only from the owner of the farm but as well from the employees. A certain 
motivation and understanding of the standard is necessary for compliance.  
5) Certified producers do not possess a higher level of education. Data analysis shows no 
significant difference between the educational level of certified producers in comparison to 
non-certified producers. However, since interviews were mostly conducted with farm 
managers and not with the actual owner of the farm, there may be some weaknesses in the 
data. In addition most producers participating on the exporting sector show a rather higher 
level of education.  
7 Conclusions 
The analysis of the decision process, coupled with the comparison of the decision process of 
certified and non-certified producers, opens up various interesting results and possibilities for 
interpretation.  
One of the most important results of the survey is that being small in size seems to be 
overvalued in the discussion, especially when talking about the technical upgrading cost of 
the farm. Even though very large farms tend to become certified to a larger extent than 
smaller ones, the results do not suggest that small producers are particularly disadvantaged in 
the compliance process, as farm size correlates only marginally with the cost of compliance.  
Instead, the results rather point to the fact that less-organized or less integrated farmers tend to 




integration tends to be of particular importance because of the direct access to information on 
the buyers’ requirements. The vertical information flow plays a major role in the motivation 
to become certified. This is underlined by the finding that most non-integrated producers pay 
little attention to the importance of EUREPGAP in maintaining market share, in contrast to 
their vertically integrated colleagues.  
Non-integrated producers mainly depend on horizontal information from other producers 
regarding all market developments in the EU. However, the results indicate that there is little 
interest in the sector in keeping non-integrated producers in the market by providing them 
information on particular market developments. One reason for that might be the very 
regulated EU import policy for Moroccan tomatoes. Morocco is only allowed to export a 
preferential quota of around 200,000 tons of tomatoes per year to the EU, and even though it 
has the production capacity, Moroccan suppliers are keen not to exceed this preferential 
quota. Hence, exporters are extremely interested in aggregating much of the quota within a 
small group of producers. According to various interviewees, the already very limited number 
of non-integrated producers’ products for the export market will disappear within few years. 
However, this trend could of course change if the EU were ready to abandon its entry price 
system.  
Another factor which might favor the readiness of less organized producers to export would 
be a functioning information system on market development, prices and quality requirements 
in the most important export destinations. At the moment, no functioning extension service 
exists in the area of Souss Massa which could complete non-integrated farmers access to 
marketing information.  
However, using the term “small” as a synonym for less organized, less educated and 
technically less advanced production, as is often the case when analyzing smallholders’ 
production, tends to be false when looking at small producers participating in the Moroccan 
tomato export sector, where producers are often only small in relative terms, and frequently 
much larger in size and in capital and human capital than small or even medium-sized 
producers producing only for the domestic market.  
The survey only provides limited information regarding the impact of EUREPGAP 
certification on poverty in terms of excluding certain producers from the export market on 
poverty. As mentioned above, small producers in the export sector are only relatively small. 
Owing to their level of human and monetary capital, it is unlikely that these producers could 
fall below the poverty line if excluded from the export market. The domestic market has 
started to provide a market for greenhouse tomatoes, especially since the importance of higher 





Some surveys exist that find that the production of higher products improves the 
competitiveness of the sector and thus increases employment (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006 
and Minton, 2006). Similar to these surveys, the producers excluded from production were 
only small in relative terms and do not belong to the group of small scale farmers. However, 
while these articles find a positive poverty balance due to increasing job opportunities 
(resulting from increasing export capacity) for those who are “very poor” (e.g. migrant 
workers from other regions), this is not the case in the Moroccan tomato sector, since EU 
policy keeps Moroccan tomato production constant. If water were not a key limiting factor 
regarding increasing the production of high-quality tomatoes, the abolition of the entry price 
system could potentially show a positive impact on poverty in combination with producing 
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E Final Conclusions and Future Research Needs 
Results of the thesis show that the agricultural trading environment is increasingly determined 
by food safety and quality standards. The increasing stringency of standards leads to 
processes of (re)distribution within value chains. For some producers, standards open up new 
opportunities as they permit market access to high value market segments. At the same time, 
the process of (re)distributing market shares is accompanied by marginalization and exclusion 
as standards may impose prohibitively high barriers for certain producers in terms of the 
short-term and long-term efforts needed for production under certification. However, the 
results of the thesis did not support the existing concern of these standards establishing a 
particular burden for exports from developing countries and small producers within 
developing countries, respectively.  
The results rather show how diverse the impact of standards on a macroeconomic as well as 
on a microeconomic level is and how complex the system of variables is which finally 
determines whether standards have a positive or negative impact on country, sector or 
producer level. The simple generalization of developing countries being a group of market 
share losers because of the increasing prevalence and stringency of standards is false.  
In addition, the analysis showed that “being small” in terms of export quantity on the country 
level does not necessarily lead to a negative impact of food safety and quality standards on the 
export share. Results of the analysis rather hint to the fact that the public as well as private 
investment in SPS activities as well as a good communicational structure on food quality 
within the country increases the SPS capacity of, respectively and thus positively affects a 
successful export performance.  
Results of the thesis show that the same differentiated perspective is necessary in order to 
understand the impact of food safety and quality standards on small producers. The 
generalization of small producers being particularly negatively affected by the higher 
prevalence of standards is far too simple. Particularly as the concept of “small farmers” as 
applied in this thesis is a relative one.  
Results of the analysis show that on a theoretical basis, small farmers could well have a 




endowments which hamper their ability to acquire information on the standard and to 
implement it. Additionally, the non-recurrent and recurrent components of the costs of 
compliance involved in a standard might be higher for small producers than for large farmers. 
And finally, from a downstream actor’s perspective, working with many small farmers instead 
of a few large ones may be less attractive owing to higher transaction costs.  
However, empirical evidence of the Moroccan case study shows that farm size only correlates 
marginally with the costs or compliance. The thesis shows how important the forward 
integration in the value chain is in order to understand the importance of food safety and 
quality standards for the marketing performance. To maintain market shares or even increase 
those in high quality markets, producers need information about the buyers’ requirements. 
Results of the survey show the importance of vertical coordination and direct information 
exchange between downstream actors, buyers and producers as information on buyers’ 
demands are rarely communicated horizontally amongst farmers themselves.  
Future research needs 
According to the three main research questions, the thesis chooses different theoretical as well 
as methodological approaches and a different set of empirical background literature. Future 
research needs will be analyzed separately for three different levels:  
A) The impact of food safety and quality standards on developing countries exports: 
The empirical evidence on the particular impact of standards on developing countries’ trade 
flows is still limited. Available surveys are mainly case studies which analyze the impact of 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on trade flows of individual developing countries’ 
export sectors. More quantitative research would be needed which leads to a differentiated 
and comparative perspective of the impact of agricultural and food standards among the group 
of developing countries. Further, the perspective of food quality and safety standards as a 
barrier and not as an opportunity is dominant within the literature. More research would be 
needed exploring how and in which manner countries manage to benefit from the increasing 







B) The impact of food safety and quality measures on small producers:  
Even though various surveys and case studies hint to the fact that small and medium farmers 
are being disadvantaged by the increasing prevalence and stringency of food safety and 
quality standards, little theoretical or empirical work has been undertaken on this subject. Few 
studies analyze the compliance process of small and medium producers in any detail. Even the 
question as to who complies with certain standards and who doesn’t stays relatively 
unaddressed. More research would be needed which explores the impact of standards on a) 
small producers and b) rural development and poverty in a systematic way. Therefore it would 
be necessary to combine socioeconomic and institutional theories.  
Many case studies report that downstream actors such as exporters are supporting small 
farmers in the compliance process. More empirical evidence would be needed as to why 
downstream actors act in this fashion, and how this affects power and value-added 
distribution along the value chain. 
For some countries and sectors, there is some empirical evidence on the exclusion of small 
farmers from high-standard markets. More evidence would be needed of how problematic 
such forms of exclusion are. Only a few studies explicitly address the household effects of 
alternative income possibilities when certain groups of farmers lose market share because of 
the increasing prevalence of standards.  
C) The compliance decision process with food safety and quality standards at the producer 
level 
For a better understanding of the impact of food safety and quality standards on different 
producer groups, two questions are of major importance: 1) Which producers comply with the 
respective standard, and which do not; and 2) why do some producers comply while others do 
not? More empirical evidence would be needed for a deeper understanding of these questions. 
Furthermore, a detailed understanding of the compliance decision process as well as of the 
different variables affecting this process is still quite limited with respect to SPS measures. 
However, various articles and studies are available which analyze farmer’s decision behavior 




Currently, surveys argue that small producers are negatively affected by standards due to the 
higher costs of compliance. This argument follows the theoretical background of the 
economies of scale. However, more research would be needed which analyses a) the cost of 
compliance for different producer groups systematically and b) which puts more emphasis on 
other (socioeconomic and institutional determinants) which are important for the decision-
making process.  
